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ABSTRACT 
This case will examine the competitiveness of Hong Kong as a financial center 
after the Asian financial crisis which had put several emerging countries in the region 
into economic turmoil and political instability. To limit our scope, only Singapore will 
be chosen as a competitor in the analysis, given the similar characteristics in the two 
economies. Specifically, the demand condition, factor condition, support condition as 
well as competition condition of the two countries will be evaluated by means of 
Michael Porter's enhanced diamond model. Recommendations will be provided in the 
last part on the means Hong Kong can achieve to outcompete Singapore as the 
international financial center in Asia. 
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Soon after Hong Kong was returned to China in July 1997, a financial crisis 
began in Asia. This turmoil created severe problems for countries in the region, 
especially the emerging markets. The impact extended to other countries and has 
given way to a global economic problem. Hence, these emerging markets had ended 
up with currency devaluations as well as political instability. In fact, impacts on their 
trading partners and competitors are also found. Hong Kong, being one of the most 
trade-dependent countries, has to face economic difficulties even though Hong Kong 
dollar is pegged against the US dollar. 
Albeit the Hong Kong Government had tried a number of methods to defense 
Hong Kong dollar as well as its capital markets, it has been ineffective in stabilizing 
Hong Kong's economy. The unemployment rate has risen to 5.7% by the end of 1998 
while real GDP has a negative growth of 5.1%. Moreover, Hong Kong SAR needs to 
face the risk of losing its free market image due to its extensive interventions in the 
stock market in August 1998. 
On 7 October 1998，the Chief Executive Officer Tung Chee Hwa released his 
second policy address From Adversity to Opportunity. One of the chapters "The 
Economy" includes "strategies for growth" and "building on our strengths," listing a 
number of centers to achieve or enhance. However, methods to achieve or enhance 
these centers and means to improve the competitiveness of Hong Kong are not 
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identified. 
In order to evaluate the viability of the 1998 Policy Address, "Financial services" 
is selected for this analysis. Financial services are important elements of high-skilled 
service cluster to attract law, accounting, banking and financial institutions. The 
business environment and competitiveness of financial services industry will be 
studied. 
With limited time and human resources, only Singapore, one of Hong Kong's 
major competitors as a financial center in Asia, will be chosen for comparison in this 
case. These two economies will be evaluated in terms of the six conditions spelt out in 
the enhanced diamond ofMichael Porter. 
After thorough analysis, recommendations on how to maintain Hong Kong's 
competitiveness as a financial center will be provided. Specifically, they will be in 
terms of demand condition, factor condition, support condition as well as the 




The Competitive Advantage ofNations 
According to Michael Porter, a nation's competitiveness depends on the capacity 
of its industry to innovate and upgrade. Companies gain advantage against the world's 
best competitors because of pressure and challenge. Competitive advantage is created 
and sustained through a highly localized process. Differences in national values, 
culture, economic structures, institutions and histories all contribute to competitive 
success. Ultimately, nations succeed in particular industries because their home 
environment is the most forward-looking, dynamic, challenging, and prods firms to 
upgrade and widen their advantages over time. 
In international markets, innovations that yield competitive advantage anticipate 
both domestic and foreign needs. On the other hand, innovations that respond to 
concems or circumstances that are peculiar to the home market can actually retard 
international competitive success. 
Once a company achieves competitive advantage through an innovation, it can 
sustain it through relentless improvement since almost any advantage can be imitated. 
If innovation ceases, the company would become stagnant, and it would be only a 
matter of time before aggressive competitors overtake it. Ultimately, the only way to 
sustain a competitive advantage is to upgrade it - to move to more sophisticated 
types. 
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Michael Porter's Diamond ofNational Advantage 
Four attributes of a nation individually and as a system contribute the diamond of 
national advantage - the playing field that each nation establishes and operates for its 
industries. These attributes are: 
1. Demand Condition 
2. Factor Condition 
3. Related and Supporting Industries 
4. Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry. 
These determinants create the national environment in which companies are bom 
and leam how to compete. Each point on the diamond — and the diamond as a system 
-affects essential ingredients for achieving international competitive success: 
> the availability of resources and skills necessary for competitive advantage in an 
industry; 
> the information that shapes the opportunities that companies perceive and the 
directions in which they deploy their resources and skills; 
> the goals of the owners, managers, and individuals in companies to carry out 
competition; 
> and the pressures on companies to invest and innovate. 
Demand Condition 
Two significant elements of demand conditions are the composition and 
character of the home market. Nations gain competitive advantage in industries where 
the home demand gives their companies a clearer or earlier picture of emerging buyer 
needs, and where demanding buyers pressure companies to innovate faster and 
achieve more sophisticated competitive advantages than their foreign rivals. 
More important than the mix of segments is the nature of domestic buyers. A 
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nation's companies gain competitive advantage if domestic buyers are the world's 
most sophisticated and demanding buyers for the product or service. Sophisticated, 
demanding buyers pressure companies to meet high standards; they prod them to 
improve, to innovate, and to upgrade into more advanced segments. 
Factor Condition 
Basic factors of production are passively inherited inputs such as natural 
resources, climate, location, unskilled and semiskilled labor, and debt capital. 
However, the importance of these basic factors has been undermined as the factors 
become readily accessible to gIobai firms through foreign activities or by sourcing on 
international markets. In contrast, advanced factors such as modem digital data 
communications infrastructure and highly educated personnel are now the most 
significant ones for competitive advantages. 
In advanced economies, a nation does not inherit but creates the most important 
factors of production - specialized factors that involve sustained and heavy investment 
because basic factors do not constitute an advantage in knowledge-intensive 
industries. To support a competitive advantage, a factor must be highly specialized to 
an industry's particular needs, such as a pool of venture capital to fund software 
companies. These factors must be scarcer, more difficult for foreign competitors to 
imitate, and they require sustained investment to create. 
Related and Supporting Industries 
The third broad determinant of national advantage is the presence in the nation of 
related and supporting industries that are internationally competitive. Internationally 
competitive home-based suppliers create advantages in downstream industries in 
several ways. First，they deliver the most cost-effective inputs in an efficient, early， 
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rapid, and sometimes preferential way. Besides, these home-based related and 
supporting industries provide in innovation and upgrading - an advantage based on 
close working relationships. Suppliers and end-users near each other can take 
advantage of short lines of communication, quick and constant flow of information, 
and an ongoing exchange of ideas and innovations. Companies have the opportunity 
to influence their suppliers' technical efforts and can serve as test sites for R&D work, 
accelerating the pace of innovation. 
Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry 
National circumstance and context create strong tendencies in how companies 
are created, organized, and managed, as well as what the nature of domestic rivalry 
will be. No single managerial system is universally appropriate. Countries also differ 
markedly in the goals that companies and individuals seek to achieve. Individual 
motivation to work and expand skills is also important to competitive advantage. The 
goals a nation's institutions and values set for individuals and companies, and the 
prestige it attaches to certain industries, guide the flow of capital and human resources 
-which, in tum, directly affects the competitive performance of certain industries. 
The presence of strong local rivals is a final, and powerful, stimulus to the creation 
and persistence of competitive advantage. 
The Diamond as a System 
Two elements - domestic rivalry and geographic concentration - have especially 
great power to transform the diamond into a system. Domestic rivalry promotes 
improvement in all the other determinants and geographic concentration elevates and 
magnifies the interaction of the four separate influences. 
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Limitations of the Diamond 
The existence of favorable conditions in every determinant is not sufficient to 
guarantee that an industry will start up and develop in a nation. The interplay of 
advantage in these determinants must yield self-reinforcing benefits that are hard for 
foreign rivals to nullify or replicate. 
According to Porter, two additional variables can influence the national system 
in important ways, and are necessary to complete the theory. These are chance and 
government. 
Chance 
Chance events are developments outside the control of firms (and usually the 
nation's government), such as pure interventions, breakthroughs in basic technologies, 
wars，external political developments, and major shifts in foreign market demand. 
They create discontinuities that can unfreeze or reshape industry structure and provide 
the opportunity for one nation's firms to supplant another's. In addition, they often 
help to accelerate the process by which an industry upgrades and penetrates 
international markets. 
Government 
Another element necessary to complete the picture is government. According to 
Porter, government's proper role is to be a catalyst and challenger; it is to encourage -
or even push - companies to raise their aspirations and move to higher levels of 
competitive performance. Government at all levels can improve or detract from the 
national advantage by implementing different policies that influence each of the 
determinants. Although government cannot create competitive industries, it can play a 
successful role by working in tandem with favorable underlying conditions in the 
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diamond. 
The Competitive Advantage ofEight Asian Nations 
This is a series ofcases that applies Michael Porter's diamond model to study the 
competitiveness of Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. The case of Hong Kong and the case of Singapore are 
relevant to our project and are therefore selected to be parts of the literature review. 
The Case ofHong Kong 
The case uses both Hong Kong diamond and China diamond to analyze Hong 
Kong competitiveness due to the strong ties between Hong Kong and China. That is， 
Hong Kong diamond can be enhanced by its access to China diamond. These 
enhancements include overcoming scarce of natural resources, reducing production 
costs, improving efficiency and technology from the savings of production costs, 
diversifying production and market. 
Although the diamond model has given an all-round consideration for those 
determinants that would affect a country and industries' competitive advantage, there 
are still criticisms from the case. 
The model does not fully explain international competitiveness. This is because 
it has presented only a closed system whereas in reality a country or place can be 
affected by other countries' economic activities and thus a single diamond may 
interact with others to form double or multiple diamonds. For instance, Hong Kong's 
economy is becoming more and more integrated with that of China. Any changes in 
China's economic system will have an impact on the Hong Kong diamond. On the 
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other hand, Hong Kong is not only affected by one other economic system since it has 
significant relations with many other countries in the world, especially the United 
States and UK economically. Therefore, in Hong Kong's case a multiple-diamond 
framework may be more applicable. 
Moreover, the model defines the effects of Government as an outside force. 
However, in the case ofHong Kong, although a laissez-faire policy is implemented, it 
is greatly affected by China's economy, which is more directly controlled by the 
China Government. In such case, it seems that the Chinese Government is an inside 
determinant rather than an outside force of the Hong Kong diamond. 
The Case of Singapore 
The case uses a single diamond to study the competitiveness of Singapore. From 
this analysis, some benefits of diamond model are identified. It bridges the gap 
between strategic management and international economics, since the diamond model 
integrates firm-level, industry-level and nation-level sources of competitive 
advantages. Also, it helps to understand facts more systematically and dynamically, 
since the four elements of diamond are operated interdependently. Moreover, it points 
out that the concept of national competitiveness is national productivity. 
However, there are still some criticisms from the case. The model is weak in 
predictive power. It fails to define clearly the conditions under which the factors of 
production are advantages or disadvantages. Also, the cause and effect relationships 
among elements of diamond are unclear due to the complicated interactions of these 
elements. 
Moreover, the model narrows the competitive determinants of a nation, since the 
elements of the diamond focus on domestic level only. Especially, if a small nation 
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has a small domestic demand but a large exports demand of an industry, the model 
may give a misleading conclusion on the nation's competitiveness. 
On the other hand, the model underestimates the total exports of a nation. It 
ignores the importance of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in a nation by 
assuming that FDI has no valuable effect on competitive advantage creation. 
However, some foreign subsidiaries of an industry may have a significant influence 





Michael Porter's diamond is chosen as the basic model in this paper to analyze 
Hong Kong's competitiveness in the financial sector. However, in reality. Hong Kong 
is already an international financial center in Asia. Hong Kong's financial sector is 
composed of both local and foreign companies to meet both onshore and offshore 
demands. Thus, some modifications of the diamond model are needed to reflect the 
situation of Hong Kong. First, the demand condition should include foreign demand 
in Asia. Second, the competition condition should include foreign competitors with 
offices located in Hong Kong. On the other hand, the modified diamond will be 
applied to the financial sector of Singapore which is a major competitor of Hong 
Kong, so that the two diamonds will be compared to reflect the competitiveness of 
financial sector ofHong Kong against its counterpart's. 
For the demand condition, gross domestic product (GDP), imports and exports of 
Hong Kong and Singapore will be used as the indicators to reflect the need of 
financing. Moreover, GDP of China, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia will be used to 
reflect the foreign demand in Asia. ‘ 
For the factor condition, labor and office costs are the two most important factors 
in affecting profit and service quality. Therefore, labor wage and the educational level 
will be used to analyze the labor market. Furthermore, office rent and price level will 
be used to study the office market. 
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For the related and supporting industry condition, industries such as legal, 
accounting, information technology (IT), telecommunication and mass media will be 
evaluated to see whether they can provide sufficient services and selections for the 
financial sector. 
For the competition condition, banking, stock and future exchanges are selected 
to represent the financial sector. For the banking industry, the "five forces" model will 
be used to reflect the competition of the industry. The five forces are rivalry, new 
entrants, substitution, buyers and suppliers. For stock and future exchanges, the 
SWOT model will be used since exchanges are monopolies in both Hong Kong and 
Singapore. The SWOT model means strength, weakness, opportunity and threat. 
For the government condition, some events indicating how Hong Kong and 
Singapore governments increase their competitiveness and handle market failure will 
be shown. Finally, the chance condition of Hong Kong will be studied to reflect the 
challenge of Hong Kong's financial sector. However, chance condition is not included 







Hong Kong GDP 
As seen from Appendix A1, during the last decade. Hong Kong has been having 
double-digit annual nominal growth rates in its GDP, reaching its peak in 1992. In 
1995, the nominal growth rate dropped to 6.6%, while the real growth rate dropped 
from 6.4% in 1992 to 3.9% in 1995. This was probably due to the relocation of many 
manufacturing facilities to the Mainland. However, from 1996, the growth rate has 
been increasing steadily, resulting in a 10-year average real growth rate of 4.7%. 
In 1998, real GDP declined by 5.1% as a whole. Specifically, GDP fell by 5.7% 
in real terms in the fourth quarter as compared to that of 1997. Furthermore, private 
consumption expenditure continued to decline substantially, by 9.3% in real terms in 
the fourth quarter ofl998, following a 10.0% decline in the third quarter. It is because 
local consumer spending remained weak in face of increased unemployment and 
moderated income in the labor market. However, economists noted that the continued 
contraction in GDP in the fourth quarter of 1998 was due to the further setback in 
both external and domestic demands upon the profound impact of the regional 
financial turmoil. With gradual stabilization in the regional and local financial 
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markets, the pace of decline in GDP in the fourth quarter had moderated somewhat 
from that in the third quarter. 
Hong Kong Trade 
Hong Kong is the world's eighth largest trading economy with 101,324 I/E firms 
and handled the import and export of HK$3,071 billion in goods, as seen from 
Appendix A2. The industry employed 514,904 people, contributing 23.4% to total 
employment as of the end of 1997. In 1990s, growth rates ofboth exports and imports 
have been declining, while re-exports expanded extensively. In 1997, imports 
increased by 5% in value to HK$l,6i5 billion, while total exports (sum of exports and 
re-exports) grew by 4% in value terms, with re-exports contributing a 5% growth. 
Imports, instead of increasing steadily in 1997, dropped significantly to 
HK$l,429.1 billion in 1998, indicating an overall decline of 11.5% as compared to 
that of 1997. Domestic exports had followed the previous trend and had resulted in an 
overall decline of 10.9% to HK$188.5 billion. Re-exports, which had maintained a 
minimal growth until July 1998, had started to decrease and had declined by 6.9%. 
As a result, total trade by the end ofl998 had fallen by 9.6%. 
Value of exports has been smaller than GDP over the last decade, and the ratio of 
exports to GDP has been declining all through the years. Although imports to GDP 
has increased in the 1990's, the ratio fell significantly in 1996 and 1997. Re-exports to 
GDP also declined in these two years, due to the poor regional economic condition. 
As seen from Appendix A3, total trade to GDP has been increasing. Although the 
growth was negative in 1996 and 1997, the more-than-doubIe amount of trade to GDP 
represents vast opportunities for trade financing. With a total trade to GDP ratio of 
over two and the fact that Hong Kong is an international trade center, demand for 
loans and trade documents should play, and will continue to play, a significant role in 
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the business ofHong Kong's financial institutions. 
China GDP 
With the introduction of modernization packages, China has experienced 
tremendous growth in its GDP. From thel980's, the annual real growth rate of China's 
GDP has been well above regional average. As seen from Appendix A4, China's 
annual real growth ratejumped from 3.84% in 1990 to 9.19% in 1991 and reached its 
peak in the following year. Although real growth rate has been declining steadily after 
1993, China still managed an above average GDP growth through the years. China's 
rapid development has contributed to an average of 9.54% of real growth in the last 
decade. 
Despite the Asian economic turmoil, China's GDP has been ever increasing. In 
1997, China's GDP was 7,607.7 billion Renminbi,叩 from 6,936.6 billion in 1996, 
representing an 8.80% real growth. Although growth was moderated in 1998, China's 
real growth rate in 1998 was 7.8%, a much higher number than regional average. 
With rapid growth, demand for project finance and trade finance is high in China. 
With the close relationship between Hong Kong and China, Hong Kong is in the best 
position to provide services in these areas. Besides being the window of China in 
raising funds abroad, financial institutions in Hong Kong can provide loans and 
credits to import and export enterprises. They can also finance construction and sales 
of infrastructure or even upgrading of technology in state-owned enterprises. Thus, 





According to Appendix A5, in 1992-1993, Singapore's GDP had jumped 
significantly from S$80,936 in 1992 to S$94,318 in 1993, representing a real growth 
of 10.41%. However, annual growth rate began to decline steadily to 6.79% in 1997, 
giving way to an average of 8.47% over the last decade. 
In 1998, the Singapore economy grew by only 1.5% in real terms, representing a 
substantial difference from the figures in the last decade. GDP growth has been 
declining steadily throughout 1998, with the Singapore economy slipping into 
recession in the latter half of the year. The major reason for the slack is the deepening 
recessions in 1998 in most parts of Asia, which has led to a slump in Singapore's 
extemal demand. Besides, the depreciations in the regional currencies also have 
lowered Singapore's cost competitiveness. A third reason is that global over-capacity 
in the electronics industry has contributed to the smaller demand in the manufacturing 
sector, which shrank by 0.5% in 1998. In fact, growth in all sectors has dropped 
significantly. For example, financial and business services had an annual growth of 
11.30/0 in 1997, but only 3.1% in 1998 and the commerce sector shrank by 4% in 
1998, down from a growth of5.7% in 1997. 
Singapore Trade 
Singapore's trade had been declining in the 1980's until 1992. As seen from 
Appendix A6, the annual nominal growth rates of its exports and imports reached 
their peaks at 23.31% and 30.83% respectively in 1994. Growth moderated in 1995， 
but value of imports dropped in 1996. Specifically, imports in 1997 incurred a 
negative growth of 0.02%. The 10-year average growth rates of exports and imports 
are 12.14% and 16.34% respectively. 
As shown in Appendix A7, annual change of Singapore's total trade reached its 
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peak in 1994. Total trade in 1994 amounted to 2.6 times of GDP, or an increase of 
9.98% growth from that of previous year. With a trade figure of more than two times 
GDP, demand for trade financing should be vast. 
Total trade of Singapore declined by 7.5% to S$354 billion in 1998, led by 
declines in re-exports and imports, which was plagued by recession in 3 of its 5 major 
markets, namely Malaysia, Japan and Hong Kong. 
Since Singapore's economy depends heavily on its trade, manufacturing and real 
estate, declining trade figures, lower property prices, and shrinking manufacturing 
sector all dragged Singapore's economy into recession in the second half of 1998. 
However, with a total trade to GDP ratio of over two and the fact that Singapore is 
one of the most trade-dependent countries, demand for loans and trade documents 
should play, and will continue to play, a significant role in the business of Singapore's 
financial institutions. 
Indonesia GDP 
Being one of the emerging markets in the region, GDP of Indonesia has been 
growing considerably in the last decade. However, the Asian financial crisis did have 
a significant impact on the Indonesian economy. In addition to escalation in its 
inflation, the currency induced extensive depreciation. As seen from Appendix A8, 
the nominal GDP for 1997 was 625,506 billion Rupiah, as compared to 532,568 
billion in 1996, representing a real growth of 4.65%. The average growth rate over the 
last 10 years is 6.99%. 
Malaysia GDP 
Malaysia's nominal GDP has also been increasing in the last decade. As seen 
from Appendix A9, the figure was 275,367 billion Ringgit in 1997, up from 249,503 
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billion. Although annual real growth rate of Malaysia's GDP has been declining 
steadily since 1994, the real growth was maintained at 7.7% in 1997. However, much 
slower growth is anticipated given the regional recession and its political instability. 
Thailand GDP 
Although Thailand's GDP has been increasing over the last decade, the growth 
rate has been falling. As compared to other emerging markets in the region, Thailand 
had experienced the biggest impact caused by the Asian financial crisis. After the 
collapse of its banking system, inflation skyrocketed and its currency exhibited 
immense depreciation. As seen from Appendix AlO, although its GDP in 1997 was 
4,827.2 billion Baht, it represented a decline of 1.34% in real terms, a substantial drop 
from 6.39% in 1996. 
Asia Trade 
Following the strong growth rates in the late 1980s，Asia's growth of both 
imports and exports peaked in 1994 — 1995. However, as seen from Appendix 11， 
growth had contracted and maintained at single-digit since then. In the first part of 
1997, many Asian countries which had been the world's most dynamic traders in the 
past were hit by the declining competitiveness of their exports. The 1997 figures 
showed that despite slowing growth in Japan and the countries hit by the financial 
crisis, the Asian region managed a real import growth of 5.5% in 1997. Exports from 
the region grew by 11.5% in volume terms. Specifically, exports grew from 976.32 to 
1,041.11 billion US dollars while imports grew from 1,039.84 to 1,060.08 billion US 
dollars in 1997. The WTO predicted that in 1998 exports from Asia would continue to 
grow more rapidly than imports as a result ofcurrency devaluations. 
In the past, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand depended heavily upon Singapore 
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for fund raising and trade financing. However, with the rapid expansion of these 
emerging markets，they had begun to develop their own stock exchanges, in order to 
raise funds for local project developments and trade financing. As a result, demand 
for Singapore's financial services would continue to decline, especially with the 




By the end ofl998, Hong Kong has a labor force of 3,431,000. As ofNovember 
1998, the labor force participation rate was 62.1%; 75.4% for male and 48.8% for 
female. The majority of the labor force is made up of the 2544 age group, 
constituting 60.5%. Unemployment hit a 15-year high of 5.7% by the end of 1998, 
and forecast expected the rate to get beyond 8% in 1999. 
In Hong Kong, the majority of its work force is engaged in import/export sector, 
comprising 15% of the total labor force. As of September 1998, there were 77,151 
employees in the banking sector, 26,897 in finance and investment companies, and 
13,577 in stock, commodity and bullion brokers, exchanges and services. However, 
by the end of 1998，there were 398,100 employees engaged in the financial, 
insurance, real estate and business services, indicating a decline of 4.3%. 
The average monthly salaries of employees in financial, insurance, real estate and 
business services as of September 1998 were HK$10,311 for males and HK$14,080 
for females, or an overall average of HK$11,489. Of the labor force, 18% possess 
tertiary or above education. 
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The labor market was performing a lot worse in 1998 than 1997. There were 
wage-cuts, wage-freeze as well as massive laid-offs during the year. For example, 
Cathay Pacific Airways announced a 5% staff cutback in Januaryl998 and salaries of 
civil servants are frozen for this year. 
With funding approved in April 1998, the Mandatory Provident Fund Authority 
was set up in June 1998. The funds to be involved in the MPF trust business are 
estimated at around HK$30 to HK$40 billion per year. According to the government, 
the scheme - both employers and employees contribute 5 percent of their monthly 
salary to the MPF - is expected to be implemented by 2000. With this law effective, 
unlike larger firms which generally have their own provident fund systems in force, 
operating costs of small companies are expected to increase as the contribution 
represents an extra cost to be included in their employees' compensation packages. 
However, given that the contribution is small, significant negative impact on the 
economy is not anticipated. 
Education 
There are eight government-funded tertiary institutes in Hong Kong. In 1997, 
there were 66,200 full-time students pursing higher education. There were also a total 
of26,415 part-time students enrolled in degree and above programs. 
In 1998，the government introduced mother-tongue education to some 300 
schools in Hong Kong. This policy inhibited Chinese-medium schools from using 
English as the medium of teaching but as a second language. Controversy erupted as 
there is a risk that English proficiency among students in Hong Kong might be 
reduced. 
Instead of increasing investment on human resources, the government has told 
university heads to fmd ways of streamlining their institutions so that the government 
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can divert money to primary and secondary schools. Specifically, the government 
plans to cut spending on each tertiary student by about 3% annually between 1998 and 
2001. 
Office 
As seen from Appendix B1, property market in Hong Kong began to prosper 
since the early 1990s; both the residential and commercial markets were very active 
and transactions were numerous. Investors were in fact speculating on the property 
market and thus, pushed the prices to a peak during the last quarter of 1996 and the 
first quarter of 1997 when private apartments were sold at over HK$202,000/sq.m. As 
a result, banks in Hong Kong became heavily involved in providing mortgage and 
loans services. However, property prices started to fall rapidly, especially after the 
Asian financial crisis. From late 1997 onwards, cases of negative assets on mortgages 
were common. Banks, as most of them had over 50% of their assets being property-
related, suffered an average of 25% fall in profits in the first half of 1998 due to 
growing bad debt charges and shrinking demand for loans. 
As of September 1998, average prices of Grade A private office were 
HK$52,740-84,536/sq.m, while property prices of Grade B and Grade C offices were 
HK$41,907-53,853/sq.m and HK$38,880-60,682/sq.m respectively. Private flatted 
factories were rated at HK$7,993-14,784/sq.m. As for rental and leases, average rents 
of private offices as of September 1998 were HK$302.8-565.9/sq.m for Grade A 
offices, HK$268.4-422/sq.m for Grade B offices, HK$228.5-319.4/sq.m for Grade C 
offices, and HK$79.3-123.5/sq.m for private flatted factories. 
Since late 1998, both rental and capital values across all sectors of the property 
market continue to decline significantly. With the downward revision of GDP growth 
and high unemployment rates, buying mood in the private residential sector was 
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selective, despite the large supply of new apartments by various real estate 
developers. In the office sector, net take-up rates have fallen significantly due to the 
fall in new demand and increase in space given up by firms downsizing or 
consolidating their businesses. 
However, with the government's economic rescue package announced on 22 June 
1998 and the banks, reduction in lending rates, the property sector is expected to be 




In 1998, Singapore has a labor force of 1,931,800. Among them, 1,125,100 are 
males. The Labor Force Participation Rate was 63.9%. Unemployment, 2.3% in June, 
threatened to rise to 5-7% in 1999 if the economy slid into a prolonged recession. 
In the Singapore society, the majority of workers were production craftsmen, 
plant and machine operators, cleaners and laborers (29.3%), while professionals & 
managers comprised 22% in 1998. Of the labor force in 1998, a majority had 
secondary or above education, with 14% possessing a degree. 
In financial and business services, there were only 273,500 employees in 1997. 
Among them, 28.5% were technicians and associate professionals and 27.9% were 
clerical workers. Positions of higher status, such as legislators, administrators, and 
managers only constitute a 14.6%. 
In terms of wages, the average monthly eaming of employees in the financial and 
business services was S$3,004 (HK$15,711) in 1997 with the average weekly hours 
worked being 43.9. However, by the third quarter of 1998，the average monthly 
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eaming of employees in the financial and business services was lowered to S$2,865 
(HK$12,835), while a 5-8% cut in various sectors. 
In short, the labor market was very weak in 1998, as compared to the net gain of 
120,300 jobs in 1997. Total employment in 1998 had realized a net loss of 17,300 
jobs, the first full-year decline in employment since the 1985 recession. 
To maintain Singapore's competitiveness in the regional recession, the 
government called on workers to accept lower wages by the introduction of its S$10 
billion package to reduce business costs. The government reduced total wage costs 
(including contributions to the Central Provident Fund (CPF) by 15%) to bring wage 
competitiveness back to 1994 level. Specifically, the employers' CPF contribution 
rate was reduced by 10% from 1 January 1999 for up to two years while the 5% 
reduction would be achieved via flexible-wage schemes. 
Education 
As of 1997, there were 7 institutions of higher learning in Singapore. 
Collectively, there were 12,345 male graduates and 11,725 female graduates. Since 
English is the first language of Singapore, students are taught in English, in addition 
to their own language. 
Singapore has introduced information technology into schools. In 1998, the 
Education and Manpower Bureau has approved S$3.2 billion for equipment and 
S$556 million for annual operating costs for computers and related equipment in 
schools. 
Furthermore, the Singapore government is upgrading the quality of the teaching 
profession in the pursuit of excellence in education by refining the training programs 
for teachers every two years. 
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Office 
Since Singapore's economy is highly dependent on its manufacturing and real 
estate activities, the substantial growth in its property market from the end of 1992 to 
a peak in mid-1997 had played a significant role in Singapore's prosperity. Thus，the 
public to private price gap became abnormally wide. Since then, growth in prices of 
both offices and residential flats were moderated. In fact, as seen from Appendix B2, 
significant decline was reported in 1998 due to the slower growth in the economy，the 
worse-than-expected performance of its trade figures and higher unemployment rates 
after the Asian financial crisis. 
As of December 1998, total office stock stood at 61.5 million sq. ft, with the 
addition of 277,000 sq. ft of new office space in the final quarter. New supply for 
1999 is estimated at 2.2 million sq. ft, about 13% lower than 1998's new supply of2.5 
million sq. ft. 
The regional economic crisis in 1998 had led to the closure of more companies 
and fewer being set up. Official statistics showed that 2,408 companies ceased 
operation in the first half of 1998，36% higher than that a year ago. The number of 
new companies formed fell 27% in the first half of 1998 to a new low of 3,208. 
Number of companies incorporated in January and February 1999 were 2,645 and 
1,774 respectively. The increase in closures and lower company formation has 
resulted in weak demand for office space. Net absorption of office space for the first 
nine months of 1998 amounted to only 355,210 sq. ft, 76% lower than that of last 
year. Weak demand coupled with large new supply led to occupancy rate dipping to 
86% from 89% a year ago. 
The decline in office rents accelerated in the last quarter of 1998. Average 
monthly rentals of office space fell by 11.8% by the fourth quarter compared to 5.6% 
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in the third, 4% in the second, and 8.3% in the first. Average gross rents of Grade A 
office space was S$1.60 (HK$7.55) per sq. ft as at the end of December 1998 whilst 
premium grade office space commanded S$6.9 (HK$32.57) per sq. ft. On average, 
office rentals had fallen by 26.9% in 1998. 
Although most of the office spaces are for lease, the capital values of premium 
grade office space were estimated at S$l,380-1,590 (HK$6,513.6-7,504.8) per sq. ft 
while other grade A office space ranged from S$620-l,450 (HK$2,926.4-6,844) per 
sq. ft, depending on the location. 
The S$10.5 billion cost-cutting package announced in November 1998 also 
included a reduction in posted land rentals, of an average of 24 to 40%, depending on 
the location, while factory rentals will shrink by 20 to 30%. Besides, in addition to the 
10% corporate tax rebate for income eamed in 1998 specified in the package, current 
property tax rebate of 55% will be extended to 30 June 2000 and property tax 
exemption for land under development will also extended. 
With the introduction of the costAax cutting package, Singapore has maintained 
its favorable environment for multinational firms to locate their headquarters. In fact, 
in October 1998, Caltex Petroleum Corporation had announced that it would relocate 
its global headquarters from Irving, Texas to Singapore, in order to take advantage of 






There were 1,302 accounting and auditing firms and 1,578 book-keeping and 
general accounting firms inl997, employing 13,209 and 4,131 persons respectively. In 
fact, by the first quarter of 1998, there were already 13,771 professional accountants 
in Hong Kong. Among the accounting firms, 941 have registered with the Hong Kong 
Society of Accountants as CPA firms. Total business receipts of the sector amounted 
to HK$7.2 billion in 1995. 
The industry is dominated by a few international firms. The world's "Big Five" 
hold a dominant share of the market in terms of professional fees eamed. Actually, 
competition is becoming increasingly keen with the existence of mega firms, such as 
Price Waterhouse Coopers and local merger of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and Kwan 
Wong Tan & Fong in April 1997. The intense competition may represent a benefit to 
the development of the financial sector, with the market ensuring the best quality 
accounting service at the lowest price. 
The Asian economic crisis also has major impacts on business opportunities for 
the accounting profession. For example, there has been a slowdown in initial public 
offering activities. However, active merger and acquisition activities as well as 
liquidation and bankruptcy filings in Asia may make up for the slower growth in the 
demand for accounting services as well as financial services in Hong Kong. 
Since the gradual liberalization of the Chinese accounting market in September 
1994, many of the world's top international accounting firms including the "Big Five” 
began to set up joint-venture firms and representative offices in the Mainland, though 
most of their regional headquarters are based in Hong Kong. With this exposure, these 
accounting firms are able to provide financial institutions elsewhere information, and 
even audit reports about Chinese enterprises. Thus, financial institutions in Hong 
Kong are able to enhance their services with the coordination of the accounting sector. 
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Information Technology 
Hong Kong's information technology (IT) market is one of the most developed in 
the region. IT spending per capita is only behind Japan and Singapore in Asia. IT 
services benefits from Hong Kong's excellent telecommunications infrastructure. 
A key component of the YY sector is the software industry. Hong Kong's strong 
financial sector has provided opportunities for local software companies to develop 
world class brokerage and investment banking software. For example, Hongkong 
Bank's Mondex Smart-card System, the electronic off-platform trading system of the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the interbank real time gross settlement system are 
among the world's most sophisticated computer applications. 
As seen from Appendix C1, the 1996 Manpower Survey of the IT industry 
suggests that approximately 40,000 IT professionals were working in Hong Kong's 
100,000 companies. The financial sector (financial, insurance, real estate, and 
business services) is the largest IT user, accounting for 41.4% of total IT employment, 
followed by wholesale, retail, import^export, restaurants and hotels sector (25.6%) and 
transport, storage and communication sector (9.1%). 
The government has set up a new Information Technology and Broadcasting 
Bureau in April 1998 to enhance and promote information infrastructure and services 
in Hong Kong. This shows the government's commitment in maintaining the leading 
role ofHong Kong as a financial and business center as well as the competitiveness of 
Hong Kong in the global market. 
The government has planned to develop a Cyberport to boost IT development in 
Hong Kong. Although this "Hong Kong Silicon Valley" needs five years to complete, 
it represents the advanced IT Hong Kong is going to develop, or the backbone of its 
successful financial sector. In other words, new information technology would enable 
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banks in Hong Kong to further develop innovative services in addition to telebanking 
and home-banking. 
The increasing computerization in both private and public sectors makes China a 
market with huge potential. Given Hong Kong's good connection with the Mainland, 
Hong Kong companies can also tap into the Chinese market through setting up joint-
ventures or acting as mediators between international IT firms and the Mainland 
counterparts. 
Legal 
The legal services industry consists of two streams of professionals, solicitors 
and barristers. Solicitors engage in general practice while barristers specialize in 
advocacy and litigation. Solicitors can only represent clients in lower courts such as 
the District Courts. 
At the end of 1997, there are 694 solicitors' firms and 468 barristers' firms in 
Hong Kong, giving way to a total of 4,969 lawyers. Being the most liberal Asian 
jurisdiction. Hong Kong has attracted a critical mass of foreign talent. As of 
Decemberl997, 52 foreign solicitors firms and 401 foreign solicitors have established 
their presence in Hong Kong. 
Despite the economic turmoil, there is a rising demand for debt restructuring, as 
well as litigation, as creditors wish to enforce their securities or recover their debts, 
many of which are cross-border work. At the same time, merger and acquisition 
activities have increased, as foreign investors tend to take advantage of cheap assets in 
the region. Hence, this growing skilled legal sector would reinforce the development 
of the financial sector in Hong Kong. 
There is expected continuation of Mainland-related fund-raising activities in 
Hong Kong, capital markets and securities practice. Besides, Hong Kong companies' 
29 
growing investment activities in the Mainland, such as the restructuring of state 
enterprises and development of the real estate market, will require more legal services 
support. Given that China is one of the most important markets for Hong Kong's legal 
services, law firms in Hong Kong could employ lawyers from the Mainland to 
enhance their services, as these lawyers are more familiar with the Chinese legal 
system and thus, have the expertise to provide more in-depth knowledge to their 
clients, including financial institutions. 
In March 1998, the chairman of Sing Tao Holdings, Sally Aw, was not charged in 
a fraud case involving her company's English-language Hong Kong Standard 
newspaper, albeit being named as a co-conspirator by the ICAC. Controversy erupted 
among the public and the Secretary of Justice Elsie Leung had to make an 
unprecedented appearance before the provisional legislature on March 23 to explain 
the government's prosecution policy. This case aroused the public's fear that well-
connected people or those who control large enterprises would be above the law. 
However, guarantees of autonomy and justice should not be dissolved by a single 
incident. 
Mass Media 
In addition to freedom of information flow, the freedom of expression and liberal 
attitude towards the press are important factors attracting a concentration of 
prestigious international publications in Hong Kong. 
With no restrictions on publications. Hong Kong has become a regional 
publishing hub, backed by a highly developed printing industry which ranks fourth in 
the world. As of the end of 1998, there were more than 200 publishing houses in 
Hong Kong. The Society of Hong Kong Publishers is the main representative body of 
this publishing industry. As of September 1997, there were 44 newspapers and 708 
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registered periodicals in Hong Kong. Of the newspapers, 28 were Chinese, 10 were 
English, 1 bilingual and five in other languages. Of the periodicals, 412 were in 
Chinese, 163 in English, 116 bilingual, and 17 in other languages. 
About 140 international media organizations have offices in Hong Kong. For 
example, Hong Kong is the base for Asiaweek, Far Eastem Economic Review and 
Readers' Digest. Other magazines like the Asian Wall Street Joumal, Financial Times, 
The Economist and the International Herald Tribunal are also printed in Hong Kong. 
Many newspapers and magazines have on-line edition. With the support of an 
excellent telecommunications infrastructure, freedom of information flow in Hong 
Kong is further facilitated. That is, market information could be obtained efficiently 
and promptly, representing a favorable element for the development of the financial 
sector. 
Besides publishers, there are five television organizations in Hong Kong, 
including the government's Radio Television Hong Kong. There are also a total of 13 
radio channels as ofMarch 1999. 
Although the government has its own television and radio channels, freedom of 
information flow is not jeopardized as there is no censorship on broadcasting. 
Besides, the public has the freedom to express their own opinions in different 
activities or shows organized by television or radio stations. 
Telecommunications 
Hong Kong is the first city in the world to have a fully digitized network and 
leads the region in terms of international call time and the penetration of telephone 
lines, mobile phones and fax machines. It operates Asia's largest satellite earth station 
and is connected to more fiber-optic cables than any other Asian economy. 
The advanced technology and quality services of Hong Kong's 
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telecommunications sector have attracted multinational companies to choose Hong 
Kong as their hub for telecommunications services in the region. In 1997, total 
volume of telephone traffic was 3,858.7 million minutes. 
Hong Kong is the largest teleport in Asia. Satellite-based telecommunications 
and television broadcasting services are provided via 32 satellite earth station 
antennas. 
Hong Kong is connected to seven submarine cable systems. They link Hong 
Kong to Japan, North America, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Australia, Europe, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, as well as Indonesia. 
According to a survey conducted by KPMG/STM Consulting on behalf of 
Australia's State Government of Victoria, the average cost of international telephone 
calls was lowest in Hong Kong. The survey also shows that it is cheaper to lease a 
fiber circuit international data line in Hong Kong than any other cities in Asia Pacific. 
The government has terminated Hong Kong Telecom's monopoly on the 
provision of international circuits and the operation of the international gateway for 
real-time voice services. Thus, Hong Kong is well ahead of most countries in the 
region in liberalizing its telecommunications market. In fact, the government has 
pledged to remove the artificial boundaries of licensing which are preventing 
convergence, and is only next to New Zealand in the government's push to legislate 
for the new information age. Efficiency is therefore guaranteed by the competition in 
the market. 
There are 4 operators in the fixed-line sector, 4 in cellular mobile (GSM), 6 in 
Personal Communication System (PCS) and 31 in paging. There are also over 120 
Intemet service providers, with Hongkong Telecom being the market leader, and 
Intemet usage had amounted to 941,464,000 minutes in the first quarter of 1998. 
32 
Long-Distance Calling 
With the removal of Hongkong Telecom's exclusive right in providing lDD 
services, competition has become increasingly keen in this sector. By the end of 1997, 
there were five major IDD operators in the market. However, there were other 
competitors such as InfoTalk, MagicTel and Telecom One that provide a low>cost 
service via the Internet. As seen in Appendix C2, calls from Hong Kong to the US and 
the UK can be as low as $0.19 at peaks via a net telephone and $0.45 under a callback 
system as ofFebruary 1999. 
As most financial institutions in Hong Kong have to deal with companies 
overseas, long-distance calling plays a significant role in their day-to-day operation. 
In addition to having a well-developed telecommunications infrastructure, being able 
to provide services cheaply can give rise to a favorable impact on the operating costs 
oflocating in Hong Kong. 
Singapore 
Accounting 
As of 1997, there were 1,012 accounting, auditing and book-keeping in 
Singapore, employing 7,545 people. Although most of them are domestic operations, 
the "Big Five" also have a presence in the Singapore society. Under this environment, 
international standards of accounting and business conduct are upheld in Singapore. 
Information Technology 
Singapore ranks first in non-Japan Asia, in terms of IT spending per capita. In 
fact, it has the world's most technologically advanced access to the Web. 
As of the end of 1997, there were 1,464 computer-related companies in 
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Singapore, with a staffof 13,569. Among the firms, 64 are programming consultants, 
420 are software developers, and over 100 are peripherals and accessories dealers and 
manufacturers. 
The government is aggressively promoting Internet usage for business and 
consumers. The government has invested more than US$200 million in Singapore-
ONE, a broadband network built by the government that allows Web-site access at the 
speed of 35 times faster than World Wide Web. By law, every new home has to be 
equipped with broadband capacity. The National Computer Board, which is 
overseeing Singapore-ONE, expects 100,000 users by the start of2000. 
Since the government opened the market in Singapore, the country's two leading 
ISPs among the three have been engaging in heavy promotion campaigns. For 
example, Singapore Telecom dropped charges by as much as 50%, giving way to a 
favorable environment for efficient financial services. 
Censorship remains an issue as government-controlled Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) blocked access to certain Web sites, mostly pornographic. The Singapore 
Broadcasting Authority maintains a list of 100 pom sites which are supposed to be 
blocked by the ISPs. However, the government has realized that it is impossible to 
censor the lntemet effectively as the sites are frequently changing their Internet 
addresses to skirt censors. As a result, the government ordered the ISPs to offer the 
option of a special family-friendly lntemet service that would automatically block 
access to offensive sites that mayjeopardize their cultural values. 
The government aims to foster computer skills that will allow Singapore to retain 
its status as an important trading hub, especially as e-Commerce becomes more 
significant to the regional trade. In doing so, the government has planned to install 
pay-phone-like Internet-linked PC kiosks at street comers. 
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Legal 
As of December 1997, there were 639 legal firms with 7,545 employees in 
Singapore. Among them, over 3,000 were practitioners. The practitioner membership 
ofthe Law Society is mandatory for all lawyers who apply for，and obtain, an annual 
practising certificate issued by the Registrar, Supreme Court. Non-practitioner 
membership is available to all persons admitted to the Roll as advocates and solicitors 
of Singapore as well as English barristers and solicitors resident in Singapore. In 
short, Singapore, like Hong Kong, has met international standards of law, 
transparency and business conduct. 
Mass Media 
In Singapore, the media are strictly monitored and sometimes censored to protect 
its cultural values. Although there are 11 Television Stations and Broadcasting 
companies and 15 radios and broadcasting bodies, only seven of them are free-to-air 
broadcasters, including the only foreign free-to-air radio station British Broadcasting 
Corporation World Service. 
As of March 1999, there are more than 200 publishing houses in Singapore; 137 
of them are for books, 84 for periodicals and 3 for Intemet. 
Singapore is notorious for the restrictive policy of its government on information 
flows. Publications such as The Economist, The Asian Wall Street Journal, Far 
Eastem Economic Review, and The International Herald Tribunal are prohibited from 
sale. 
In addition to superb geographic location, strong communications infrastructures, 
institutional advantages such as the transparency and efficiency of government, the 
honesty of public administration, which frees firms to pursue business without 
concem for corruption and effective legal system, openness to information and ideas 
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is also a significant element in the development of an international financial center. 
Thus, to maintain its status of financial center, Singapore might have to grant freedom 
to the press as well as information flows, especially with the rapid development ofthe 
Internet. 
Telecommunications 
There is only one "state-controlled" telephone company in Singapore - Singapore 
Telecommunications Limited (SingTel) — which provides a variety of services from 
land and mobile phones to Internet, paging, phone books and postal services. 
However, as of the end of 1997, there were 51 telecommunications companies 
employing a total of7,945 people. 
During 1998, SingTel launched its first satellite, ST-1. Besides, SingTel Mobile 
became the first mobile operator in Asia to offer DualBand service. Nearly 5,000 
foreign companies have chosen to base their regional telecommunications operations 
in Singapore. 
As of February 1999，there were 1,770,000 fixed lines, 1,063,400 mobile 
subscribers, 1,300200 paging subscribers, 412,600 Internet Dial-up subscribers, and 
10,900 Mobile Data subscribers in Singapore. Number of International Telephone call 
minutes was recorded as 60.83 million. 
Although SingTel's monopoly does not end until 2000, 10% of SingTel's mobile 
and paging service customers had switched to its competitors in 1997 when the 
government liberalized Singapore's mobile and paging sectors in April 1997. 
MobileOne joined SingTel Mobile & SingTel Paging as the second mobile & paging 
services provider. 
Since liberalization is limited, competition is not as keen as in Hong Kong. Thus, 
charges for mobile and paging services in Singapore are generally higher. However, in 
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face of the economic slowdown in the region, Singapore's Ministry of Trade and 
Industry has recommended in its Competitivessness Report to reduce the charges for 
telecommunications services including IDD, international local leased circuits, and 
public data services, in order to maintain Singapore's competitiveness in business 
costs. 
TeleTech Park, located in Singapore Science Park II, is a research and 
development center for telecommunications and information technology operated by 
Singapore Telecom. It has optical fibre links for the fast exchange of voice, data, 
image and video information with key research and resource centers and databases 
located both locally and abroad. In fact, it is the first installation of its kind to be built 
in Asia. 
Long-Distance Calling 
Given the monopoly of SingTel, the prices of international calling services are 
expensive. As of January 1999, IDD service from Singapore to the US is around S$1 
(HK$4.72) per minute, and around S$1.40 (HK$6.61) from Singapore to the UK, seen 
in Appendix C3. 
However, with pressure from the government to bring cost competitiveness back 
to 1994 level, IDD rates to 137 destinations were lowered by up to 49.8%. Despite the 
cuts, revenue from International telephone services went up 7.3% from S$l,906.1 
million (HK$8,996.8 million) to S$2,045.7 million (HK$9,655,7 million). 
As compared to Hong Kong's rates, prices of IDD service in Singapore are still 
very high. Thus, it would be more costly for multinational enterprises, especially 
those that are heavy users of long-distance calling or those that need to log onto 
overseas databases, to operate in such an environment. Thus banks operating in 
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Singapore would have to incur huge cost in telecommunications, especially if they 
choose to provide toll-free numbers for its customers. 
Competition Condition 
Hong Kong Banking Industry 
Hong Kong maintains a three-tier system of deposit-taking institutions, 
composing of licensed banks, restricted licence banks (RLB) and deposit-taking 
companies (DTC). They are collectively known as authorized institutions under the 
Banking Ordinance. These institutions operate in Hong Kong as either locally 
incorporated companies or branches of foreign banks. 
Only licensed banks may operate current and savings accounts, and accept 
deposits of any size and maturity. Restricted licence banks are principally engaged in 
merchant banking and capital market activities. They may take call, notice or time 
deposits of any maturity and in amounts of HK$500,000 and above. Deposit-taking 
companies are mostly owned by or otherwise associated with banks and engage in a 
range of specialized activities, including consumer finance, trade finance or securities 
business. These companies are restricted to taking deposits of HK$100,000 or above 
with an original term to maturity of at least three months. 
New Entrants 
Local potential market participants of licensed banks must have been an RLB or 
DTC for 10 years and have minimum HK$4 billion in assets, minimum HK$3 billion 
in deposits and minimum HK$150 million for capital requirement. On the other hand. 
Foreign potential market participants of licensed banks must have a local 
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representative office for 1-2 years and have minimum US$16 billion on assets. 
For the case of RLBs, local potential participants just need to satisfy the 
minimum capital requirement of HK$100 million. For the case of DTCs, local 
potential participants just need to satisfy the minimum capital requirement of HK$25 
million. However, foreign potential participants of RLBs and DTCs not only need to 
satisfy the capital requirement of local participants but also must have a local 
representative office for 1-2 years. 
Based on the above entry criteria, the minimum assets size requirement of 
US$16 billion for foreign banks is effectively blocking full participation of smaller 
foreign banks in the banking sector. On the other hand, the time period requirement of 
10 years for local bank applicants is over burdensome and unnecessarily restrictive in 
evaluating new market entrants. Both requirements have the effect of reducing the 
level of competition in the industry. 
Fund Suppliers 
At end-November 1998, there were 174 licensed banks, 62 restricted licence 
banks and 105 deposit-taking companies in Hong Kong. Together they operated a 
comprehensive network of 1,586 local branches. Of these 341 authorized institutions 
(AI), 308 were beneficially owned by interests from over 30 countries. There were 
also 143 local representative offices at end-November 1998. 
These AIs provide sufficient choices for depositors. Depositors can make their 
decisions based on interest rates and services of AIs. However, all banks are govemed 
by Interest Rate Rules (IRR) of the Hong Kong Association of Banks. They must 
provide common interest rates for current accounts, savings accounts and time 
deposits with a maturity or call period below seven days. Thus, depositors have no 
choices in interest rates govemed by IRRs that reduce the level of competition. 
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Fund Users 
Based on the total loans and advances for use in Hong Kong in Appendix D1, 
there were four items with more than 10% of market share in December 1998. They 
were Building (21.21%), Trade (9.08%), Financial Concems (12.33%) and 
Residential Properties (26.34%). Only the real estate related share had already 
accounted for 51.34%. These figures imply that Hong Kong is a trade and financial 
center with a huge real estate market. 
The total loans and advances of 1998 were dropped to HK$1,958,493 million 
from HK$2,037,278 million in December 1997. However, Residential Properties was 
raised by 2.76% to 26.34%. It implies that banks can easily restructure their asset 
portfolio from high-risk segments to low-risk segments within a short period. It also 
means fund users have less power to bargain on financing demands from banks. 
Substitution 
There are at least two segments of fund users, including individual and 
commercial. For individuals and small businesses, they may have relatives and friends 
to substitute AIs for their financing. However, not all people have rich relatives and 
friends to provide funds. Thus, most of them have no substitution of AIs. On the other 
hand, large businesses can obtain funds from stock and debt markets. Thus, they have 
more channels as substitutes of AIs. It implies that AIs have less competition in the 
individual and small business segment. 
Rivalry among Existing Banks 
Based on a report from the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in December 1998 in 
Appendix D2, scores (from 4 = favorable to 0 = unfavorable) of larger Hong Kong 
banks are 4 for complete product lines, 3 for strong focus on consumer/small business 
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and 3 for strong brand differentiation. However, scores of smaller Hong Kong banks 
are 2, 2 and 1 correspondingly. In other words, smaller banks are less competitive as 
they only focus on some segments such as properties and business near their branches. 
On the other hand, there is a "one building" condition for foreign banks licensed 
in and after 1978. They are restricted to set offices in no more than 2 separate 
buildings where one is for back office and the other is for regional office. The 
condition creates an uneven playing field for banks in Hong Kong, especially when 
some foreign banks (37 out of 144) are able to have branch networks and others are 
not. 
Hong Kong has a simple tax rate of just 16%. Moreover, Hong Kong applies a 
"source principle" that charges only income arising in or derived from domestic 
transactions. Thus, it can promote offshore competition. However, there are some 
measures to prevent over-lending and over-competition. First, banks are required to 
maintain a BIS capital adequacy ratio of 8%. The consolidated capital adequacy ratio 
for locally incorporated institutions as a whole was around 18.6% as of the end of 
September 1998. Second, all AIs are required to comply with the statutory minimum 
liquidity ratio of 25%. Third, AIs are required to report their assets according to a 
standardized framework on a quarterly basis. Under this system, loans are classified 
as pass, special mention, substandard, doubtful or loss, with the latter three categories 
collectively regarded as "classified assets". At end-September 1998，the ratio of 
classified loans to total credit exposures was 4.92% for the banking sector as a whole. 
Case: HSBC 
Referring to Appendix D3, the real estate related share accounted for 51.15% of 
total loans and advances in 1996 and increased to 52.22% in 1997. It shows that 
HSBC focuses on low-risk segments. On the other hand, there was a great mismatch 
41 
in maturity between liability (customer accounts) and asset (loans and advances). For 
3 months or less accounts in 1997, liability and asset accounted for 93.57% and 
35.25% respectively. Hence, strong brand image of HSBC may represent a helpful 
means in keeping short-term liabilities and thus, release HSBC's mismatch problems. 
Case: Hang Seng Bank 
As seen from Appendix D4, the real estate related share accounted for 66.19% of 
total loans and advances in 1996 and increased to 66.33% in 1997. This shows that 
Hang Seng Bank is also highly focused on low-risk segments. There was also a 
serious mismatch in maturity between liability (customer accounts) and asset (loans 
and advances). For 3 months or less accounts in 1997, liability and asset accounted for 
98.18% and 14.55% respectively. Again, it implies that strong brand image and 
branch networks of Hang Seng Bank are helpful in keeping short-term liabilities and 
thus, has released Hang Seng Bank from mismatch problems. 
I 
Singapore Banking Industry 
There are three categories of commercial banks in Singapore; they are full 
licence banks, restricted banks and offshore banks. Full banks are permitted to carry 
out the whole range of banking business approved by the Banking Act. Restricted 
banks are permitted to engage in the same range of domestic banking business as the 
full licence banks, but they can only have one main branch, and they cannot accept 
Singapore dollar savings accounts and Singapore dollar fixed deposits of less than 
S$250,000 from non-bank customers. Offshore banks have the same opportunities as 
the full and restricted banks in business transacted in their Asian Currency Units, 
while their scope of business in the Singapore dollar retail market is slightly more 
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limited, ln the domestic market, offshore banks can neither accept interest-bearing 
deposits from customers other than approved financial institutions, nor can they open 
more than one branch. In addition, offshore banks may extend a maximum of S$300 
million in total credit facilities to resident non-bank customers in Singapore dollars. 
Besides the three categories of commercial banks, financial institutions may also 
operate as merchant banks. Typically, the activities of merchant banks include 
offshore banking, corporate finance, underwriting of share and bond issues, mergers 
and acquisitions, portfolio investment management, management consultancy and 
other fee-based activities. 
On the other hand, there are finance companies in Singapore focusing on small-
scale financing which banks are less interested in providing services. However, 
finance companies cannot accept deposits from customers who are repayable on 
demand by cheque, draft or order. Finance companies are also prohibited from 
granting unsecured credit facilities exceeding S$5,000 to any clientele. 
New Entrants 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has not approved a full banking 
licence to any new entrants since 1971. Moreover, MAS has no approval for 
formation of new restricted banking licences since 1973. Thus, offshore banking 
licenses are now the only option remaining to new entrants. As a result, onshore 
banking is protected from the intense competition caused by new entrants. 
Fund Suppliers 
As of the end ofNovember 1998, there were 32 full licence banks，10 of which 
were local-incorporated, with the rest being branches of foreign banks. Moreover, 
there were 13 restricted banks and 104 offshore banks, all of which were branches of 
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foreign banks. Furthermore, there were 74 merchant banks and 18 finance companies. 
Although there were only 32 full licence banks in Singapore, they represent a wide 
range of choice for depositors based on interest rates and service qualities. 
Fund Users 
Based on the total loans and advances for use in Singapore in Appendix D5, 
there were four items with more than 10% of market share in December 1998. They 
were Building (37.83%), General Commerce (14.21%), Financial Institutions 
(14.98%) and Individuals (14.35%). On the other hand. Manufacturing accounted for 
8.08%. These figures show that Singapore is a trade, industrial and financial center 
with a large real estate market. 
The total loans and advances of 1998 were raised to S$151,636.60 million from 
S$143,243.80 million in 1997. However, General Commerce was dropped by 4.18% 
to 14.21% in 1998，while Building was raised by 3.5% to 37.83%. These figures 
imply that Singapore banks are similar to Hong Kong banks as they can easily 
restructure their asset portfolio from high-risk segments to low-risk segments within a 
short period. Again, it indicates fund users' low bargaining power in negotiating 
financing terms with banks. 
Substitution 
The situation of Singapore is similar to that of Hong Kong. The detail is 
available in the Substitution sector ofHong Kong Banking Industry. 
Rivalry among Existing Banks 
Based on a report from the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in December 1998 in 
Appendix D2, scores (from 4 二 favorable to 0 = unfavorable) of Singapore banks 
were 3 for complete product lines, 3 for strong focus on consumer/small business and 
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2 for strong brand differentiation. Brand differentiation in Singapore banks was not as 
strong as that ofbanks in Hong Kong, probably due to the fact that there are only 10 
full local banks in Singapore. 
Besides，there is a "one branch" condition for all restricted banks and offshore 
banks. Moreover, there are restrictions in setting-up off-premise ATMs, participating 
in shared-ATM networks and offering Electronic Funds Transfer at Point-of-Sale 
services. However, the influence is limited to individual and small business as these 
banks are focused on large businesses and offshore banking. 
Singapore has an incentive for offshore banking charging tax in 10% instead of 
26%. However, the Banking Act has some requirements to prevent over-lending and 
over-competition. First, all banks are required to maintain minimum cash balances 
with MAS of not less than 6% of their liabilities base. Second, all banks are required 
to maintain a capital adequacy ratio of 12%. Third, all banks are required to hold 
minimum liquid assets of not less than 18% of their liabilities base. Fourth, banks are 
required to disclose the level of their non-performing loans, as well as past and future 
provisions. 
Hong Kong Stock Market 
In Hong Kong, there is only one stock exchange - the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong (SEHK). In February 1999, there were 491 trading members (102 individual 
and 389 corporate members) and 71 non-trading members (54 individual and 17 
corporate members). On the other hand, there were 679 listed companies, 41 China-
incorporated enterprises and 14 foreign companies with securities traded in February 
1999. 
There are several major requiremertts for new applicants to list in SEHK. First, 
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they must have a trading record of not less than three financial years during which the 
profit attributable to shareholders must not be less than HK$20,000,000 in the most 
recent year and not less than HK$30,000,000 in respect of the two preceding years. 
Second, the prescribed minimum percentage of securities to be in public hands is 25% 
for market value not exceeding HK$ 4,000 million and at least 10% for market value 
over HK$4,000 million. Third, there should not be less than three holders for each 
HK$1,000,000 of the issue and there must be a minimum of 100 holders. Fourth, the 
expected market capitalization of a new applicant at the time oflisting must be at least 
HK$100,000,000 with at least HK$50,000,000 held by the public. 
Strength 
Brokers are not required to charge the same transaction fees. They can charge 
any fees not less than 0.25% of the transaction values. Besides brokerage fee, there 
are transaction levy of 0.011% and stamp duty ofO.125%. Finally, HK$0.5 is charged 
as a trading tariff on each purchase and sale transaction. Moreover, transactions can 
be settled before 3:45 p.m. on the second trading day following the transaction. This 
day is known as T+2, limiting the settlement risk to 2 days. Besides, the liquidity of 
SEHK is quite high. Average monthly tumover in 1998 was HK$141759.3 million 
and the average monthly tumover against its capitalization in 1998 was 5.52%. 
Furthermore, Hong Kong has a pegged exchange rate policy. Thus，the exchange risk 
of foreign investors is minimal. 
Weakness 
There is no clear listing criteria for infrastructure projects, which provide no 
profit in the development phase but after completion. Thus, all these projects face 
uncertainties to list in SEHK. Furthermore, there is no electronic share price 
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applications for retail; all applications have to place orders through stockbrokers. 
Opportunity 
Hong Kong's debt market is still underdeveloped. There is room to attract large 
companies to list their debts in SEHK. In addition, the rapid growth of China is 
expected to continue. Thus, SEHK should attract more China-incorporated enterprises 
to list in SEHK as a means for their financing. 
Threat 
Some major listed companies of SEHK may also have listings in other exchanges 
to enhance their international images. Hence, their actions may dilute the tumover of 
SEHK. 
Singapore Stock Market 
The Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) is the monopoly of stock trading in 
Singapore. In December 1998, there were 30 company members (24 local and 6 
international members) and 108 individual members. On the other hand, there were 
310 companies ofMain board, 66 companies of SESDAQ board and 18 companies of 
CLOB International board listed in February 1999. SESDAQ (Stock Exchange of 
Singapore Dealing and Automated Quotation) offers access to the capital market for 
small and medium sized companies incorporated in Singapore. CLOB International is 
created for trade in a number of international securities listed on foreign exchanges. 
There are several major requirements for new applicants to list in SES's Main 
board. First, local companies must have a trading record of 5 years while foreign 
companies need three. Second, there must be at least 25 % of issued and paid-up 
capital in the hands of at least 1,000 shareholders. Third, local companies must have 
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paid-up capital of at least S$15 million with cumulative pre-tax profits of at least 
S$7.5 million for the last 3 years, and a minimum pre-tax profit of at least S$1 million 
for each of those 3 years. The amount is double for foreign companies. 
For secondary listing of Main board, companies must have a market 
capitalization of at least S$50 million with cumulative pre-tax profits of at least S$15 
million for the last 3 years and a minimum pre-tax profit of S$2 million in each of 
those 3 years. Moreover, at least 2,000 shareholders worldwide must be listed or will 
be listed concurrently on another stock exchange. Since this report is focused on the 
Main board, other listing requirements are not given here. 
Strength 
There are clear listing criteria for infrastructure projects that achieve no profit in 
the development phase but after completion. First, a project must have a paid-up 
capital of at least S$30 million before the public-offer with a total cost of at least 
S$300 million. Second, the project should normally have a concession period of at 
least 15 years remaining as at the date of the listing application. Third, at least one 
promoter holds at least 20% of the pre-flotation issued capital. 
Besides, there is an electronic share price application system for the Central 
Provident Fund members. Thus, they can utilize the island-wide network ofautomatic 
teller machines to make share applications without placing orders through 
stockbrokers. 
Weakness 
Brokers are required to charge the same transaction fees. As shown in Appendix 
D6 these fees are much higher than the brokerage charges in Hong Kong. This is 
probably due to the absence of price competition. Moreover, the settlement of trades 
48 
is fixed on the seventh calendar day following the date of transaction. Thus, the 
settlement risk is higher than that of Hong Kong. Besides, the liquidity of SES is 
lower than that of SEHK. Its average monthly turnover in 1998 was S$8072.9 
(HK$37634.9) million and the average monthly tumover against its capitalization in 
1998 was 1.93%. On the other hand, SES requires each listing with at least 1,000 
shareholders to hold the paid-up capital. 
Opportunity 
Singapore's debt market is still not fully developed. There is room to attract large 
companies to list their debts in SES.� 
Threat 
Nearby countries of Singapore are enhancing their own exchanges that reduce 
the dependency of financing from Singapore. 
Hong Kong Futures Market 
The Hong Kong Futures Exchange (HKFE) is the monopoly exchange of futures 
trading in Hong Kong. In January 1999, there were 135 exchange members and 120 
clearing members. The major product is Hang Seng Index Future (HSIF). 
Strength ‘ 
The liquidity of HSIF is very high. The average monthly volume in 1998 was 
580,809 and the total initial margin of average monthly volume was HK$36,591 
million. 
Weakness 
The initial margin is too high - HK$63,000 per contract. Moreover, there is a 
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minimum commission per contract of HK$100 for ovemight and HK$60 for day-
trade. These charge floors may reduce the level of price competition. Besides, HKFE 
has insufficient product innovations and linkages with other major exchanges. 
Opportunity 
HKFE may develop Euro money futures products. 
Threat 
Other exchanges may develop similar products to that of the HKFE. 
Singapore Futures Market 
The Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) is the monopoly 
exchange of futures trading in Singapore. In June 1998, there were 70 corporate 
members, 646 individual non-clearing members and 120 clearing members. The 
major products are 3-month Eurodollar Futures, 3-month Euroyen Tibor Futures and 
Nikkei 225 Stock Index Futures. 
Strength 
The initial margin of Eurodollar, Euroyen and Nikkei futures are just US$675, 
¥29,700 and ¥625,000, and there are no minimum commission rates for these futures. 
Furthermore, the liquidity of these futures are very high. The 1998 average monthly 
volumes of Eurodollar, Euroyen and Nikkei futures were 819,760, 729,793 and 
461,463 while the total initial margin of 1998 average monthly volumes are 
US$553.34 (HK$4,285.8) million, ¥21,675 (HK$l,279.6) million and ¥288,414 
(HK$17,135.9) million respectively. 
SIMEX showed its commitment to innovation when it successfully co-pioneered 
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the world's first mutual offset trading system (MOS) with the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME). Through a similar MOS between SIMEX and the International 
Petroleum Exchange (IPE) of London, Brent Crude Oil Futures is traded continuously 
for about 18 hours in different time zones. 
Weakness 
SIMEX does not have high-liquidity products underlying with local securities. 
Opportunity 
SIMEX may develop Euro money futures products. 
Threat 
Other exchanges may develop similar products to that of SIMEX. 
Government Condition 
Hong Kong SAR Government 
Several events of Hong Kong SAR Government affecting competitiveness of its 
financial sector are shown in the following. 
Special Finance Scheme for Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) 
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has 
established the Special Finance Scheme for SMEs. The Scheme aims to help SMEs in 
securing finance from participating authorized institutions through the provision of 
Government guarantee. The Credit Guarantee Scheme, introduced earlier by the Hong 
Kong Export Credit Insurance Corporation for exporters, has been subsumed under 
this Scheme. The maximum Government commitment for the Scheme amounts to 
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HK$2.5 billion. 
The maximum amount of guarantee offered to each enterprise under the Special 
Finance Scheme for SMEs is HK$2 million or 50% of the approved loan, whichever 
is less. The loan may be offered as a term loan or in the form of a revolving credit 
line. The guarantee period is up to a maximum of 365 days. All businesses registered 
in Hong Kong are eligible tojoin the scheme, except for lending institutions and their 
associates. 
This Special Finance Scheme is intended to assist financing of SMEs, for most 
banks cut credit lines of SMEs as they shift their focus to less risky segments after the 
Asian financial crisis. Since SMEs have less channels to obtain funds than large 
enterprises which may issue new stocks and debts, the Scheme may motivate banks to 
release credits for SMEs as part of the risk is absorbed by the Government. 
The Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Limited Mortgage Insurance Program 
The Board of Directors of the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (HKMC) 
approved on 24 February 1999 the detailed design of the mortgage insurance product 
to be offered to the Approved Sellers to enable homebuyers to secure mortgage loans 
up to 85% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. The product was developed in consultation with 
Approved Sellers on the Consultative Group on the Mortgage Insurance Program and 
prospective mortgage re-insurers. 
This program not only reduces the initial payment of homebuyers but also 
increases the focus ofbanks in mortgage lending. The LTV is increased from 70% to 
85%, representing a growth rate of more than 20%. Thus, the program provides extra 
business to absorb fund exited from high-risk segments such as SMEs' lending. 
Defending Hong Kong's Monetary Stability 
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The involvement of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) in the stock 
and futures markets in August has been the subject of controversy, since Hong Kong 
has always been in favor of leaving markets alone, as much as possible. Indeed, Hong 
Kong has for many years been named as the freest market in the world. 
HKMA was against speculators who wanted to take advantage of passiveness 
under the discipline of the rule-based currency board arrangement. They produced 
very high interest rates with a view sending to the stock market and benefiting from a 
short position in stock index futures. 
Although HKMA can defend the market manipulation of Hong Kong currency 
market, HKMA creates new uncertainty to the stock market. This uncertainty can 
damage the transparency of the system and reduce the competitiveness of the stock 
market. 
Strengthening of Currency Board Arrangements in Hong Kong 
Managing the risks of free capital flows, including the possibility of financial 
markets being subject to manipulation that exacerbates financial volatility and hence 
the severity of economic adjustment, HKMA issued a package of seven technical 
measures listed in Appendix El to strengthen the Currency Board arrangements in 
Hong Kong. 
These technical measures can enhance the base and liquidity of inter-bank 
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markets as well as reduce the interest rate volatility. In other words, there are 
measures to reduce interest rate risk and enhance the stability of interest rate margins 
ofbanks. 
Reforming the Securities and Future Markets 
From the 1999-2000 budget issued on 3 March 1999, the Financial Secretary 
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announced to consolidate the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Futures 
Exchange and clearing houses into a single market operator in the form of a listed 
commercial entity. This move will separate ownership from trading rights and thus, 
will enhance competition. It should lead to greater market innovation and cost 
efficiency. However, the first and most critical step will be for the two exchanges to 
agree to arrangements for their demutualization and merger within seven months. 
Singapore Government 
Several events of Singapore�Government affecting competitiveness of its 
financial sector are shown in the following. 
Revised Wage 
Last year, the National Wages Council (NWC) agreed to the need to reduce 
overall wage costs including Central Provident Fund (CPF) by 15% from the 1997 
level. Thus, the Committee on Singapore Competitiveness (CSC) recommended a 
10% point reduction in employers' CPF contribution rate. This CPF cut represents 
some 8% of overall wages. To achieve a reduction of 15% in overall wage costs, the 
NWC recommended that in addition to the CPF cut, total wages for 1998 should be 
trimmed by 5%-8% as compared to that ofl997. However, companies, which perform 
exceptionally well or very poorly, may deviate from this general guideline. 
These measures show NWC's determination to achieve greater confidence 
among global investors in the Singapore economy, to help companies regain their 
cost-competitiveness, to preservejobs for workers and to minimize unemployment. 
Liberalization the Banking Sector to Foreign Competition 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is reviewing all restrictions in the 
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domestic retail sector, including limits on opening additional branches, setting-up off-
premise ATMs, participating in shared-ATM networks and offering Electronic Funds 
Transfer at Point-of-Sale services. MAS is also fine-tuning rules governing the 
granting of offshore licences to foreign banks, in order to improve reputable foreign 
banks' accessibility to the domestic market.. 
The objectives of liberalization will encourage banks to provide efficient and 
innovative services, comparable to the best available in other major financial centers. 
Moreover, it will nurture a group of robust local banks to measure up against leading 
international players operating in Singapore and abroad. It will also encourage strong 
and well-managed foreign institutions to expand their activities in Singapore, and take 
a stake in the growth and stability of Singapore's financial system. 
Governance of the Exchanges 
Last year, a committee of MAS recommended that the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore (SES) and Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) be 
demutualized to separate ownership from participation in the exchanges, and 
integrated into a single corporate entity. The Committee was of the view that this will 
be the best position for the exchanges to develop new business opportunities, and thus 
provide maximum incentive for owners and management to strive for competitive 
advantage and operational efficiencies. 
The new integrated entity will be a for-profit, private-held stock company with a 
single pool of owners at the holding company level. The new entity will aim for a 
public listing within about 5 years, providing an extra incentive for owners to ensure 
its success. 
The committee also recommended that existing SES members as well as SIMEX 
clearing and non-clearing seat-holding members be allocated shares in the new entity. 
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in recognition of their contributions to the development of SES and SIMEX and to 
encourage their commitment to the new enterprise. 
Chance Condition 
Chance ofHong Kong's Financial Sector 
Several opportunities for the financial sector of Hong Kong are shown in the 
following. 
Dollarization 
Feasible dollarization in Hong Kong is a banking system doIIarization, instead of 
a total dollarization. Total dollarization involves the replacement of all coins and notes 
of the Hong Kong dollar with the US dollar, and thus, it will require an amendment to 
the Basic Law. On the other hand, banking system dollarization leaves the current 
notes and coins in circulation in Hong Kong dollar, but redenominates all assets and 
liabilities in the banking system in US dollars. 
The assets of the Exchange Fund, largely in US dollars, are over HK$600 billion. 
These assets are able to meet the total potential claims of HK$189.4 billion including 
HK$87 billion notes, HK$5.4 billion coins, HK$8 billion ofliabilities in the clearing 
balances plus credit Liquidity Adjustment Facility balances and HK$89 billion 
potential claims from exchange fund bills. Hence, the conversion of Hong Kong's 
dollar to the US dollar will be easily achievable from a central banking perspective. 
Although dollarization can improve confidence and reduce interest rate as 
currency risk is removed, it requires the cooperation and support from two major 
parties - China and the US. Thus, there are uncertainties whether the process of 
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dollarization can be run smoothly. 
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company (Gitic) . 
On 6 October 1998, Beijing authorities alarmed at Gitic's staggering foreign 
debts and reckless management and thus shut the firm down instead of allowing the 
local government to bail it out. Foreign bankers were worried whether their loans 
would be repaid，since those loans were unregistered. By shutting down Gitic, 
Premier Zhu Rongji sent a message to local officials and their foreign lenders that 
China is starting to discipline profligate financial institutions. Hence, foreign bankers 
should look more carefully at credit quality and ask for proof of loan registrations 
instead of political support before providing loans to the Chinese enterprises. 
Although this incident forces Hong Kong banks to make large provisions, it 
represents a chance for them to restructure their asset portfolio. As a result. Hong 
Kong banks have become less concentrated in risky assets and have increased their 
concems towards asset quality controls. Such restructuring will strengthen their 
positions and will be helpful in their future businesses. 
Asian Financial Crisis 
The crisis forced foreign bankers to cut credit lines of most Asian countries as 
the risk was increasing with the value of collateral decreasing. Especially, the 
Japanese banks needed to reduce their lending and produce better ratios in their 
balance sheets in order to prevent bankruptcy. Thus, Japanese banks gave up their 
market shares in Asian countries and thus, provided opportunities for other banks. In 
other words. Hong Kong's financial institutions have the opportunity to replace the 
Japanese banks in this market segment. 
Developing the Debt Market 
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From the 1999-2000 budget. Hong Kong Monetary Authority will list Exchange 
Fund Notes on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in the second half of 1999 and will 
allow the use ofExchange Fund paper as margin collateral for trading in stock options 
and futures. This listing will enhance their liquidity in the secondary market, enlarge 
the investor base to include retail investors and contribute to the development of retail 
debt market. 
This listing will pave the way for listing of Hong Kong dollar bonds issued by 
govemment-owned corporations and eventually to the listing and trading of corporate 
bonds on the exchange. Then, it can also encourage reputable oversea companies, 
especially Mainland enterprises, to obtain funding through the issue of debt papers in 
Hong Kong. 
New Currency Euro 
On 1 January 1999，eleven European Union countries linked their currencies to 
Euro. New Euro notes will be introduced to replace their currencies by 2002. Euro is 
expected to be a currency compatible to US dollar in the international market. Thus, 
there will be a huge demand in Euro similar to US dollar. Hence, Euro provides an 
opportunity for Hong Kong to create Euro-related products, such as Euro-fiitures that 
are similar to Eurodollar and Euroyen futures in Singapore. 
lntemet Trading 
As information technology is improving the trading environment of stock and 
futures in Hong Kong, lntemet trading is expected to be widely available in the near 
future. Although it can enhance the competitiveness of the market as it can reduce 
transaction time and human errors, it may threaten the business of stockbrokers as the 
dependency of stockbroker is reduced. Stockbrokers will specialize in some parts of 
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full services including order, settlement and analysis to retain clients. The impact is 
particularly significant to small-scale stockbrokers, as they may not have sufficient 
resources to enhance all services, especially analysis services. Thus, they are forced to 
improve their competitiveness through specialization. On the other hand, non small-
scale stockbrokers have to enhance their analysis so that they can produce high-
quality recommendations to attract their clients and charge higher fees. As a whole, 





The semi-closed market and the non-freely convertible currency (RMB) of China 
provide the excellent situation for H6ng Kong to be the window of China. Hong Kong 
is acting as the financial center to finance the growth of China and it is hard to find 
another city to replace Hong Kong in the near future. Although it is expected that 
China will gradually open its financial market, such as RMB deposits, the process 
would not create serious threats against Hong Kong's position unless China fully 
opens its financial market in one of its cities such as Shanghai. However, given the 
high credit risks involved and insufficient transparency of China's companies listed in 
Hong Kong, Hong Kong Monetary Authority should improve its risk management 
and supervision in its banking sector. 
In order to sustain the demand of financing in Hong Kong, the government can 
promote trade finance by increasing the competition of the transportation industry. 
Intense competition can force service providers to reduce price and improve quality. 
In other words, market forces can retain and attract the demand using Hong Kong 
transportation services. Moreover, the government can decrease the risk of real estate 
finance to stimulate demand by providing stable land sales timetables that can reduce 
uncertainty and frustration of property prices. 
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Factor Condition 
Although Hong Kong has high quality offices and related infrastructures, the 
rents and the prices of offices are also high. This could hamper the competitiveness of 
Hong Kong. To manage the cost of offices, the government can announce a stable 
commercial land supply to reduce speculation of commercial buildings. 
On the other hand. Hong Kong has a pool of high quality professionals but again 
costs of staffing are too high. In recent months, the wages of employees in Hong 
Kong have been adjusted downwards in the free market. Adhering to its laissez-faire 
policy, government should not intervene in the negotiations between employers and 
employees. 
English language proficiency of the people in Hong Kong is not as good as that 
of Singaporeans. To make the matter worse, Hong Kong is converting to mother-
tongue education in Chinese at both primary and secondary levels. This may further 
reduce the English language ability of students and thus, weaken students' leaming 
effectiveness at universities. Therefore, the government should reconsider the impact 
ofsuch implementation on the whole education system. The government may want to 
balance the usage ofEngIish and Chinese in an integrated education program. 
Support Condition 
Hong Kong professional firms, such as accounting and legal firms, have not only 
reached the international standards but have also extended their services to China to 
support their clients, such as financial companies, in analyzing businesses in China. 
Moreover, the freedom of media is upheld to sustain the freedom of information. 
However, the "Hong Kong Standard" case has somewhat created a negative image for 
the legal system of Hong Kong. Thus, the government may have to review the case 
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and leave it to the court in order to retain the confidence of the general public and the 
international society on Hong Kong legal system. 
On the other hand, the government has announced to develop a Cyberport. This 
decision will enhance the growth of IT and telecommunications industries. It will also 
provide support to new innovation and product development of other industries. 
Competition Condition 
Hong Kong Banking Industry 
The competition of Hong Kong's banking industry is very high, especially in 
personal banking among large banks, time deposits among small banks and housing 
mortgage among all banks. Moreover, there are two distinguished advantages in Hong 
Kong's banking competitiveness. First, there is neither reserve requirement nor 
minimum cash balance. Second, the tax rate (16%) is low, representing a source to 
motivate foreign deposit in Hong Kong. 
However, interest rate rules, the one building condition and the tight entrant 
requirement restrict flill competition in the banking industry. Thus, the government 
should remove interest rate rules and the one building condition in order to ease the 
entrant requirement. Moreover, banks have strong bargaining power against small and 
medium enterprises (SME). Although the government has already provided special 
finance scheme for SMEs, the result is unsatisfactory. Therefore, the government 
should review the scheme with consultation from both SMEs and banks. 
Furthermore, there is a high requirement in liquidity ratio (25%) to prevent banks 
from over-lending in mortgages. However, it is necessary to avoid maturity mismatch. 
In order to avoid maturity mismatch, the government has already purchased 
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mortgages from banks through the Kong Hong Mortgage Corporation (HKMC) which 
sells the mortgage portfolio in the form of debt securities to institutional investors. 
Although the demand for debt securities is low, it is expected that it will increase as 
the mandatory provident fund is commenced. Once the demand expands, the 
government should motivate banks to reduce mortgage assets in their portfolios by 
selling these mortgages to HKMC and thus, transfer these funds to other segments, 
such as loans to SMEs. 
Hong Kong Stock and Futures Markets 
Low transaction fees, small settlement risk (T+2) and minimal currency risk are 
advantages to sustain a high liquidity in Hong Kong's stock market. However, the 
government's intervention in August 1998 has created uncertainty to investors and 
companies' cross-listings may dilute the liquidity of stock trading. In order to reduce 
the uncertainty, the government has announced to decrease the Hong Kong stock of 
the exchange fund from 17% to 5%. Besides, it has modified the selling methods to 
minimize disruption to the market. Some possible methods are offering private 
placements, selling convertible debts and options, listing companies' buyback as well 
as direct selling through the exchange. Moreover, the government has announced to 
merge the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange to 
increase competitiveness and maintain liquidity. It is expected that the merge will 
reduce transaction fees and settlement risks through the integration of the exchanges 
and clearing houses. Besides, it will allow the new exchange to develop an integrated 
IT strategy by combining resources from the current exchanges and clearing houses. 
However, the merge is insufficient to enhance the status of Hong Kong as a 
regional or as an international financial center. Hong Kong should develop new 
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products to attract the demand from the region and to take advantage of the Asian 
time zone advantage. The Hong Kong government has already announced to list its 
debts in the exchange; it will provide a leading effect for other companies to list their 
debts in Hong Kong as the demand of debt securities will be expected to increase due 
to the mandatory provident fund. The debt market development is important for Hong 
Kong in enhancing its status as a regional center since there is no major debt market 
center in the region for Asian companies. On the other hand, the government should 
assist the new exchange to negotiate with exchanges of other time zones to form 
partnerships. As a result, the new exchange could develop globally trading products to 
enhance the status of Hong Kong as an international financial center. Euro-related 
products are opportunities for the new exchange. In short, information technology 
innovation and product development will be the driving forces for Hong Kong to 
increase its competitiveness. 
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APPENDIX A1 
HONG KONG GDP 
Nominal GDP* Annual Growth Rate Real GDP** Annual Growth Rate 
1988 “ 455,022 — 18.3% “ 549,302 8.0% 
198 9 523,861 ~ 15.1% 563,368 2.6% 
199 0 582,549 — 11.2% 582,549 — 3.4% 
199 1 668,512 — 14.8% 612,016 ~ 5.1% 
199 2 779,335 — 16.6% 650,347 _ 6.3% 
199 3 897,463 ~ 15.2% 690,223 6.1% 
199 4 1,010,885 — 12.6% 一 727,506 ~ . 5.4% 
1995 1,077,145 — 6.6% 755,832 “ 3.9% 
1996 1,192,609 — 10.7%� 790,400 “ 4.6% 
1997 1,339,094 — 12.3% 832,114 5.3% 
Average 12.7% 4.7% 
* Figures in million Hong Kong dollar (at current market prices) 
** Figures in million Hong Kong dollar (at 1990 prices) 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Annual Digest ofStatistics 
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APPENDIX A2 
HONG KONG EXPORTS, IMPORTS & RE-EXPORTS 
Exports* Annual Imports* Annual Re-exports Annual 
Change Change Change 
1988 217,664 —...11.48%~~ 微巡： 3 1 . 9 8 % 275,405 50.68% 
1989 224,104 2.96"—。 &2,‘7'8]" 12.83% 346,405 — 25.78% 
1990 ~225,875 ~~0.79% —642,530 —14.17% — 413,999 19.51% ~ 
1991 —231,045 —2.29% —778，982 —21.24% — 534,841 29.19% ~ 
1992 ~234,123 ~"1.33% ~955,295 ~~22.63% — 690,829 29.17% — 
1993 223,027 -4.74% ~[^2,597 12.28% 823,224 — 19.16% 
1994 222,092 ~~-0.42% "[,250,709 16.61% — 947,921 15.15% — 
1995 —231,657 —4.31% 1,491,121 一19.22% —— 1,112,470 17.36%~~ 
1996 212,160 ~~-8.42% "T,535,582 2.9S% 一 1,185,758 6.59% ~ 
1997 211,410 -0.35% ~X^ 15，090 5.18% 1,244,539 一 4.96% 
Average -0.32% 13.95% 18.24% ~ 
* Figures in million Hong Kong dollar (at current market prices) 
Source: Hong Kong Cemus and Statistics Department, Annual Review ofHong Kong External Trade 
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APPENDIX A3 
HONG KONG TRADE TO GDP 
Total Trade* Annual Change Total Trade/GDP Annual Change 
198 8 991,867 31.20% 2.18 0.11% 
198 9 1,133,290 14.26% 2.16 ~ ~ -0.01% — 
199 0 1,282,404 13.16% 2.20 一 0.02% — 
199 1 1,544,868 20.47% 2.31 — 0.05% ~ 
199 2 1,880,247 21.71% 2.41 0.04% 
199 3 2,118,848 12.69% 2.36 -0.02% 
199 4 2,420,722 14.25% 2.39 0.01% 
9^95 2,835,248 17.12% 2.63 0.10% — 
1996 2,933,500 3.47% “ 2.46 -0.07% 
丽 3,071,039 4.69% 2.29 -0.07% ~ " 
Average 13.38% 0.55% 
*Figures in million Hong Kong dollar (at current market prices) 




|Nominal GDP* Annual Growth Rate Real GDP** Annual Growth Rate 
198 8 1,470.4 —— 24.78% 1,695.4 — 11.27% 
198 9 1,646.6 — 11.98% 1,764.3 — 4.06% 
199 0 1,832.0 — 11.26% 1,832.0 — 3.84% 
199 1 2,128.0 — 16.16% 2,000.4 — 9.19% 
199 2 2,586.4 — 21.54% 2,285.2 _ 14.24% 
199 3 3,450.1 — 33.39% 2,593.5 13.49% 
199 4 4,711.1 ~ ~ 36.55% 2,921.9 一 12.66% 
199 5 5,940.5 — 26.10% 3,230.1 — 10.55% 
199 6 6,936.6 16.77% 3,538.4 9.54% 
199 7 7,607.7 — 9.67% 3,849.9 一 8.80% 
Average 20.04% 9.54% 
* Figures in billion Renminbi (at current market price) 
** Figures in billion Renminbi (at 1990 prices) 




Nominal GDP* Annual Growth Rate Real GDP** Annual Growth Rate 
1988 ~~51,642 — 18.53% 56,821 11.63% 
198 9 59,344 14.91% 62,289 9.62% 
199 0 67,879 14.38% 67,879 8.97% 
199 1 75,527 — 11.27% 72,804 . 7.26% 
199 2 80,936 — 7.16% 77,338 6.23% 
199 3 94,318 16.53% 85,387 10.41% 
199 4 108,217 14.74% 94,352 ~ ~ 10.50% 
199 5 120,704 — 11.54% 102,556 — 8.70% 
199 6 130,775 8.34%� 110,573 7.82% 
199 7 143,014 — 9.36% 118,078 “ 6.79% 
Average 11.98% 8.47% 
* Figures in million Singapore dollar (at current market price) 
** Figures in million Singapore (at 1990 prices) 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
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APPENDIX A6 
SINGAPORE EXPORTS & IMPORTS 
Exports* Annual Growth Rate Imports* Annual Growth Rate 
198 8 79,051 ~ 30.32% 39,306 — 37.02% 
1989 87,117 — 10.20% — 44,665 13.63% 
199 0 95,206 一 9.29% 一 52,752 18.11% 
199 1 101,880 — 7.01% 59,025 11.89% — 
199 2 103,351 _ 1.44% 63,484 1.55% ~ 
199 3 119,475 15.60% 74,012 16.58% 
199 4 147,327 23.31% 96,826 30.83% 
199 5 167,515 “ 13.70% 118,268 22.15% — 
199 6 176,271 5.23% 125,014 5.70% 
199 7 185,614 — 5.30% 124,986 -0.02% — 
Average 12.14% 16.34% 
* Figures in million Singapore dollar (at current market prices) 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
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APPENDIX A7 
SINGPORE TRADE TO GDP 
Total Trade* Annual Change Total Trade/GDP Annual Change — 
1988 118,357 32.47% 2.29 11.76% 
198 9 131,782 11.34% 2.22 — -3.11% 
199 0 147,958 “ 12.28% 2.18 — -1.84% 
199 1 160,905 8.75% 2.13 -2.26% 
199 2 166,835 3.69% 2.06 -3.24% 
199 3 193,487 15.98% 2.05 — -Q.48% 
199 4 244,153 26.19% — 2.26 9.98% 
199 5 285,783 17.05% 一 2.37 4.94% 
199 6 301,285 5.42% 2.30 一 -2.69% “ 
199 7 310,600 _ 3.09% 2.17 “ -5.73% 
Average 11.32% -0.60% — 
*Figures in million Singapore dollar (at current market prices) 




Nominal GDP* Annual Growth Rate Real GDP** Annual Growth Rate 
198 8 149,395 — 16.14% 182,982 “ 5.78% 
198 9 179,608 — 20.22% 196,627 “ 7.46% 
199 0 210,866 — 17.40% 210,866 7.24% 
199 1 249,969 — 18.54% 一 225,522 “ 6.95% 
1992 282,395 “ 12.97% 240,090 6.46% 
199 3 329,776 — 16.78% 255,687 — 6.50% 
199 4 382,220 ~ 15.90% 274,965 “ 7.54% 
199 5 454,514 — 18.91% 一 297,567 “ 8.22% 
1996 "532,568 17.17% 321,313 7.98% 
199 7 625,506 17.45% 336,251 4.65% 
Average 17.15% 6.99% 
* Figures in billion Rupiah (at current market price) 
** Figures in billion Rupiah (at 1990 prices) 




Nominal GDP* Annual Growth Rate Real GDP** Annual Growth Rate 
1988 ~ 90,861 14.11% ~ 96,579 8.80% 
198 9 102,451 ~ 12.76% 105,445 — 9.18% 
199 0 115,701 12.93% 115,701 9.73% 
199 1 132,381 14.42% 125,648 8.60% 
199 2 148,537 ~ 12.20% 135,445 7.80% 
199 3 165,206 ~ 11.22% 146,749 ~ 8.35% 
199 4 190,274 _ 15.17% 160,400 “ 9.30% 
199 5 218,671 — 14.92% 175,416 — 9.36% 
199 6 249,503 14.10% 190,510 8.60% 
1997 ~~275,367 — 10.37% 205,186 7.70% 
Average 13.11% 8.73% 
* Figures in billion Ringgit (at current market price) 
** Figures in billion Ringgit (at 1990 prices) 




Nominal GDP* Annual Growth Rate Real GDP** Annual Growth Ra te~ 
1988 - 1,559.8 19.99% — 1,750.8 — 13.29% — 
1989 1,857.0 “ 19.05% 1,964.2 “ 12.19% 
199 0 2,183.5 _ 17.58% 2,183.5 “ 11.16% 
199 1 2,506.6 — 14.80% 2,370.4 — 8.56% 
199 2 2,830.9 12.94% 2,562.0 8.08% 
199 3 3,179.5 — 12.31% 2,785.1 — 8.71% 
199 4 3,634.8 — 14.32% 3,032.9 — 8.90% 
199 5 4,194.6 ―― 15.40% 3,295.5 — 8.66% 
199 6 4,689.6 一 11.80% 3,506.2 6.39% 
199 7 4,827.2 — 2.93% 3,459.1 — -1.34% 
Average 13.37o/o 7.86% 
* Figures in billion Baht (at current market price) 
** Figures in billion Baht (at 1990 prices) 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
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APPENDIXA11 
ASIA EXPORTS & IMPORTS 
Exports* Annual Growth Rate Imports* Annual Growth Rate 
1988 364.79 22.94% “ 369.34 29.02% 
1989 407.03 11.58% 418.21 13.23% 
199 0 452.65 11.21% 470.92 — 12.60% 
1991 516.08 14.01% “ 538.28 14.30% 
199 2 585.60 — 13.47% 610.09 13.34% —— 
199 3 646.44 — 10.39% 686.08 — 12.46% 
199 4 768.55 — 18.89% 803.33 “~~ 17.09% — 
199 5 933.57 一 21.47% 988.65 — 23.07% 
1996 976.32 — 4.58% — 1,039.84 5.18% 
199 7 1,041.11 6.64% “ 1,060.08 1.95% 
Average 12.36% 12.43% 
* Figures in billion US dollar 
Source: Government Financial Statistics Yearbook 
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APPENDIX B1 
PROPERTY PRICES OF HONG KONG 
Private retail ~~Grade A off ice~ Grade B office Grade C office Private flatted 
premises factories 
1991 55,103^8,453 43,651-68,076 34,868-59,721 37,524-44,241 8,925-14,180 
1992 75,824-108,849 67,766-88,687 Al ,950-12JT^ 49,267-51,033 11,540-17,575 
1993 95,750-137,309 89,956-118,73 7 62,450-74,620 58,634-65,522 "l3,648-22,678 
1994 97,534-170,557 124,126-191,711 74,861-111,072 65,448-83,528 "l3,807-24,791 
1995 98,441-145,305 108,823-146,847 67,932-104,364 60,083-88,896 "l2,664-21,612 
1996 112,467-202,797 90,507-160,021 65,462-90,534 55,460-78,038 "ll,363-18,608 
1997 173,871-345,241 96,130-205,775 68,758-123,904 57,565-77,692 11,284-19,309 
Note: prices in Hong Kong dollar/sq.m 
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, Hong KongAmiual Digest ofStatistics 
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APPENDIX B2 
PROPERTY PRICE INDICES OF SINGAPORE 
Price Index Rental Index 
1995Quarter4 170.4 103.3 
1996 Quarter 1 171.6 106.9 
1996Quarter2 173.0 108.6 
1996Quarter3 173.6 107.3 
1996 Quarter4 170.4 l04.9 
1997 Quarter 1 162.0 lQ4.2 
1997Quarter2 159.7 — 103.4 
1997Quarter3 154.7 iQi.i 
1997Quarter4 � 152.2 98.8 
1998 Quarter 1 145.4 9 ^ 
1998 Quarter2 132.8 90.8 
1998 Quarter 3 116.2 86.0 
1998Quarter4 106.3 81.8 
All index numbers based on 1990 prices 
Source: Singapore Department ofStatistics 
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APPENDIX B2 
HONG KONG INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
1996 IT Employment % 
IT Management 6,777 iYg 
System Analysis 5,857 i ^4 
Application Programming 8,029 21.2 
Technical Support 7,327 i ^ 
Hardware Support 3,639 ^ 
Computer Operation 4,416 iT6 
IT Research & Development 530 一 f ^ 
IT Education & Training ],494 3 ^ 
Total � 3 8 , 0 6 9 100.0 
Note: 2,500 IT employees from some 06,000 establishments with ess than 5 employees are not 
covered. 
Source: Vocational Training Council, 1996 Manpower Survey Report: Information Technology Sector 
1996 
Number of Establishments - Data Processing & Tabulating 1 ’610 
Employment 9 494 
Value Added (million dollars) 3,088 
Contribution to GDP (%) o l 
Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Profiles of Hong Kong 's Major Services Industries 
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APPENDIX B2 
PRICES OF LONG-DISTANCE CALLING FROM HONG KONG 
Peak Rate Non-peak Rate 
CTI 
Australia 0 ^ 048 
Canada 0 ^ o ^ ‘ 
China (Shenzhen, Shekou) [ ^ f ^ 
Japan 2.88 — 2.88 
Singapore 2.88 — 2.88 
USA 0.88 0.48 
United Kingdom 0.88 o ^ 
Hongkong Telecom � “ 
Australia 2.99 2.39 
Canada 1.79 — 1.19 
China (Shenzhen, Shekou) 2.40 2 ^ 
Japan 4.89 3.39 
Singapore 3.91 — 3.39 
USA 1.48 0.99 
United Kingdom 3.24 一 2.39 
Hutchison 
Australia 1.98 0.98 
Canada 0.98 - o.48 
China (Shenzhen, Shekou) 2.30 f ^ 
Japan 5.68 2.98 
Singapore 4.38 3.68 
USA 0.98 0.48 
United Kingdom 5.38 2 l g 
New T&T* 
Australia 4.43 — o.25 
Canada 2.70 — Q.2S 
China (Shenzhen, Shekou) 2.30 —— f ^ 
Japan 4.97 Q.25 
Singapore 4.15 4.15 
_ _ U ^ 2.70 一 0.25 
United Kingdom 4.87 0 ^ 
New World Z l Z I I Z I Z I Z Z Z Z Z Z Z I 
Australia 1.98 0.98 “ 
Canada 0.98 — 0.48 
China (Shenzhen, Shekou) l.98 f ^ ~ 
Japan 2.98 2.98 
Singapore 3.60 3.39 
USA — 0.98 0.48 
United Kingdom 2.18 0 99 ‘ 
InfoTalk 
All countries o.03 一 o.03 “ ~ 
Note: prices are in Hong Kong dollar per minute 
•non-peak rates are effective starting from the 11也 minute 
Source: New World Telecom 
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APPENDIX B2 
PRICES OF LONG-DISTANCE CALLING FROM SINGAPORE 
Peak Rate Non-peak Rate 
Singapore Telecom — 
Australia | _ ^ o.90 
Canada 1.00 0.80 
China (Shenzhen, Shekou) 1.90 1.80 
Hong Kong 1.10 — 0.90 
Japan 1.30 1.20 
USA 1.00 • 0.80 
United Kingdom � .30 1.10 
Note: prices are in Singapore dollar per minute 
Source: Singapore Telecom 
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APPENDIX D1 
HONG KONG LOANS AND ADVANCES 
All Figures in HK$ million 12/1997 12/1997 12/1998 12/1998 
Manufacturing 110675— 5.43%— 93536 4.78% 
Agriculture and Fisheries 982 0.05% 1251 0.06% 
Transport and Transport Equipment 96208 4.72% 103073 5.26% 
Electricity, Gas and Telephone 27186" 1.33%— 25094 1.28% 
Building, Construction, Property 440296 21.61% 415327 21.21% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 205679 “ 10.10%. 177904 9.08% 
Mining and Quarrying 281 “ 0.01% — 98 0.01% 
Miscellaneous 1155971 ~~56.74% 1142209 58.32% 
Hotel, Boarding Houses and Catering � 36879 “ 1.81%— 40153 2.05% 
Financial Concerns 259664" 12.75�/�— 241493 ~ 12.33% 
Stockbrokers 15439 0.76% 4 ^ 0.23% 
Professional and Private Individuals 694699 34.10% 733888 37.47% 
Flats under Government Scheme 60399 2.96% 74227 3.79% 
Other Residential Properties 480401 ~~23,58% 515887 26.34% 
Other Purposes 153900" 7.55%— 143776 7.34% 
All Others 149289~ 7.33% 122214 6.24% 
Total 2037278 ~ 100.00% ~"1958493 100.00% 
*Real Estate Related 981096+ 48.16%| 100544l| 51.34% 
Source: Hong KongMonetary Authority, Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
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APPENDIX D2 
BANK KEY SUCCESS FACTOR PERFORMANCE COMPARSION 1998 
4 = Favorable Large Smaller Hong Singapore 
0 = Unfavorable Hong Kong Kong Banks Banks 
Banks 
Complete Product Lines 4 2 3 
Strong Focus On Consumer / Small Business 3 2 3 
Strong Brand Differentiation 3 j 2 
Source: KPMG/Barents Analysis, interviews 
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APPENDIX D3 
SELECTED ACCOUNTS OF HSBC ANNUAL REPORTS 
All Figures in GBP million 1996 HK ~ 1 ^ ~ 1997 HK ~1997 
0 ^ On|y 
Loans & Advances to Customers 117453 32907 100.00% 149464 43434 100.00% 
Residential Mortgages 2644910821 32.88i 36431 “ 14792 34.06% 
Other Personal * \4112~160^ 14.01% \1A90~~5463 12.58% 
Commercial, Industrial and Trade — 32731 _ 6971 TUm^ _^7982 _225£_ ~J6J0^ 
Commercial Real Estate 12598 47l6~ 14.31% \S261~6329 14.5lW 
OtherPropertyRelated — 4070 ~ 1301 3.95^ 4907 1560 ~J.59% 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions 5737 1477— 4.49% 12971 —3208 7.39% 
Other Commercial -21096 35W^ I0.69^ 24416 4828 ~ll.l2% 
Loans & Advances to Customers 
Repayable on Demand / Short Notice 32548 28.46% ~ 22101 ~15.14% 
3 Months or Less but not on Demand 9212 8.06%~ 29353 20.11% 
1 Year or Less but over 3 Months 13425 — 11.74% 18517_ ~~12.69% 
5 Years or Less but over 1 Year 32481 — 28.40% 41219 "^8.24% 
Over 5 Years 29453 25.76% 37901 25.96% 
Customer Accounts 151149 — 100.00% 178621 100.00% 
Repayable on Demand — 78586_ 5l j ^ _ 8 ] 9 ^ ^ ^ M I ^ 
3 Months or Less but not on Demand 64881 42.93% — 85172 47.68% 
1 Year or Less but over 3 Months 5743 “ 3.80% 一8563 — 4.79% 
5 Years or Less but over 1 Year 1726 1.14%" 2100 l.l8% 
Over 5 Years 213| 0.14%| 826| 0.46% 
*Hong Kong Government Housing Scheme Included 
Source: HSBC, AnnualReport 1997 
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APPENDIX B2 
SELECTED ACCOUNTS OF HANG SENG BANK ANNUAL REPORTS 
All Figures in HK$ million 1996 1996 1997 1997 
Loans & Advance to Customers 164668 Too.00% 2 0 6 6 6 ~ 100.00% 
Individuals 81166 4 9 . 2 ^ 103083 49.88% 
HK Government Housing Scheme 23276 14.14% 25U3 12.15% 
Other Residential Properties 50778 30.84% 68335 33.07% 
Others 7112 — 4.32% 9 ^ 4.65% 
Industrial, Commercial and Financial Sectors 65320—39.67% ~~85722 41.48% 
Property Development and Investment 34946 2 1 . 2 ^ 43640 21.12% 
Financial Concerns 2232— 1.36% 3193 1.54% 
Stockbrokers ； 393 — 0.24% m 0.17% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 4968 3 .02% 5977 ~ 2 . 8 9 % 
Manufacturing 3261 3 j , 9 8 % _ _ ^ 2 ^ _ _ L 5 0 % 
Transport and Transport Equipment 6880 4 1 ^ 8046 ~~3.89% 
__Others 12640— 7.68% 21417 10.36% 
Trade Finance 14236 8.65% ~ 13411 6.49% 
Advances for Use outside Hong Kong 3946 2.40% 4451 2.15% 
Loans & Advances to Customers 
Repayable on Demand / Short Notice 9664 — 5.94% 1 3 ^ 6.85% 
3 Months or Less but not on Demand 16426 10.10% 15711 ~ ~ 7 . 7 0 % 
1 Year or Less but over 3 Months 14897— 9.16% ~ 2 1 5 8 4 10.58% 
5 Years or Less but over 1 Year 54633 —33 .60% ~~"62180 30.48% 
Over 5 Years 67091 ~41.26% 91165 44.69% 
Non-Performing Advances & Overdue > 1 Month 1 9 ^ 1.20% 2039 ~~1.00% 
Customer Accounts 314683 "i00.00% 323194 100.00% 
Repayable on Demand 112556~l5.77% 108551 33.59% 
3 Months or Less but not on Demand 197404 —62.73% ~T08769 64.60% 
1 Year or Less but over 3 Months 7350— 2.34% 6962 2.15% 
5 Years or Less but over 1 Year 2o| O.m%| 447l| 1.38% 
Source: HangSengBank, AnnualReport 1997 
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APPENDIX D5 
SINGAPORE LOANS AND ADVANCES 
All Figures in S$ million 12/1997 12/1997 12/1998 12/1998 
Total Loans and Advances 143243.80 “ 100.00%l51636.60 100.00% 
Agriculture, Mining and Quarrying 187.60 0.13% 223.6 0.15% 
Manufacturing 12472.00— 8.71%~2249.20 8.08% 
Building and Construction 49169.60" 34.33%~57368.50 37.83% 
General Commerce 26349.50 18.39% 21549.10 14.21% 
Transport, Storage and Communication 3575.70 — 2.50% ~4459.70 2.94% 
Financial Institution 20997.40 — 14.66%"T2719.80 14.98% 
Professional and Private Individuals 22775.40 — 15.90%~^]766.10 14.35% 
Others � | 7716.5o| 5.39%| 11300.60| 7.45% 
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore 
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APPENDIX D6 
SINGAPORE STOCKBROKER TRANSACTION FEES 
Contract Value Rate 
On the first S$250,000 — 0.95% — 
On the next S$250,000 ~0.8S5% — 
On the next S$250,000 0.76% 
On the next S$250,000 — 0.665% — 
On the next S$500,000 0.475% 
On amounts exceeding S$ 1.5 million |Nefiotiable, subject to a minimum of 0.285% — 
Source: Stock Exchange of Singapore 
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APPENDIX El 
SEVEN TECHNICAL MEASURES OF HKMA 
The first technical measure is in the form of a clear undertaking from the HKMA to licensed 
banks to convert Hong Kong dollars in their clearing accounts into US dollars at the fixed exchange 
rate ofHK$7.75toUS$l. 
The second technical measure involves the removal of the bid rate of the Liquidity Adjustment 
Facility (LAF). 
The third technical measure deals with the determination of the LAF offer rate which is to be 
renamed the Base Rate. LAF will also be renamed as the Discount Window. The Base Rate will form 
the foundation on which different discount rates are computed and for use in the ovemight repurchase 
agreements (repos) through the Discount Window in respect of different percentage thresholds of 
Exchange Fund paper held by licensed banks. 
The fourth technical measure concems the manner in which Exchange Fund paper can be used by 
licensed banks to obtain overnight Hong Kong dollar liquidity from the HKMA at the close of the 
money market in Hong Kong through the Discount Window. 
The fifth technical measure is in the form of a clear commitment from the HKMA that new 
Exchange Fund paper will only be issued when there is an inflow of funds enabling the additional 
paper to be fuUy backed by Foreign Reserves. 
The sixth technical measure spells out, for the purpose of accessing the Discount Window, a 
schedule ofdiscount rates applicable for different percentage thresholds ofholdings ofExchange Fund 
paper by licensed banks, as follows: 
Fund paper held bv a licensed bank Applicable Discount Rate 
First 50 percent Base Rate 
Next 50 percent Base Rate plus 5 percent or ovemight 
HffiOR for the day, whichever is higher 
The seventh technical measure deals with the position ofthe existing eligible paper for LAF other 
than Exchange Fund paper. Overnight repos using such paper will still be allowed. For triple-A rated 
paper and Specified Instruments, the schedule of discount rates applicable to Exchange Fund paper will 
apply For other eligible paper, the schedule of discount rates will be at a premium ofO.25% over those 
applicable to the discount ofExchange Fund paper. 
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